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THE VANISHING CORE OF JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE
Evan C. Zoldan*
With Congress firmly in control of the jurisdiction, resources, and structure
of the federal courts, the scope of the judiciary’s independence is limited indeed.
If there is an attribute that can be considered the core of judicial independence, it
is the power of the federal courts to decide cases pending before them. In a pair
of recent decisions, however, the Supreme Court has called into question whether
the federal judiciary possesses even this limited attribute of independence. This
Article examines how the Court has blurred the line between the judicial and legislative powers by ceding to Congress the authority to direct federal courts to decide pending cases for particular parties. After identifying the thorny issues that
the Court has left unsettled, this Article suggests an approach to resolving them
that preserves both Congress’s role in lawmaking as well as the core of the judiciary’s independence.
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INTRODUCTION
When the history of the Roberts Court is written, the independence of the
judiciary will be one of its central themes. Indeed, Roberts’s preoccupation
with the decisional independence of judges—that is, whether individual judges
make decisions free of bias—was evident even before his confirmation as Chief
Justice. In a well-known exchange during his Senate confirmation hearing,
then-Judge Roberts proclaimed his vision of judicial independence: “Judges are
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . . [A]nd I will
remember that it’s my job to call balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”1 As
Chief Justice, Roberts has continued to emphasize his vision of the judicial
role, explaining that judges “do not advance political positions;”2 “[we] do not
sit on opposite sides of an aisle, we do not caucus in separate rooms, we do not
1

Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55–56 (2005) [hereinafter John Roberts Confirmation Hearing] (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to
be Chief Justice of the United States).
2
JOAN BISKUPIC, THE CHIEF: THE LIFE AND TURBULENT TIMES OF CHIEF JUSTICE JOHN
ROBERTS 11 (2019).
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serve one party or one interest. We serve one nation.”3 And in a remarkably
pointed public defense of the courts in the face of growing accusations of their
partisan leanings, the Chief Justice responded: “[w]e do not have Obama judges
or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges. What we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing their level best to do equal right to those
appearing before them.”4
Although Roberts is not alone in asserting that judges exercise decisional
independence,5 skeptics often overshadow the defenders of this position.6 Perhaps most vociferously, former President Trump made clear his position that
judges who ruled against his favored policies in litigation are “activists,” that
the Court of the Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is “out of control,” and that the
United States court system itself is “broken and unfair.”7 Perhaps not surpris3

University of Minnesota Law School, The 2018 Stein Lecture: John G. Roberts, Jr., Chief
Justice of the United States, YOUTUBE (Oct. 22, 2018), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9
i3RwW0y_kE [https://perma.cc/2LWX-X4C5]; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Roberts’s Rules,
ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2007), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/01/robertssrules/305559/ [https://perma.cc/FFF8-6DLC] (describing Roberts’s interest in the public’s
perception of the Court as an “impartial institution that transcends partisan politics”).
4
Mark Sherman, Roberts, Trump Spar in Extraordinary Scrap Over Judges, ASSOCIATED
PRESS (Nov. 21, 2018), https://apnews.com/c4b34f9639e141069c08cf1e3deb6b84 [https://pe
rma.cc/BUG6-AEZW]. Perhaps Chief Justice Roberts’s insistence on the independence of
the judiciary stems from the concern that a loss of the public’s support could lead to a loss of
the judiciary’s power. Political science literature suggests that Supreme Court justices “have
strong incentives to be concerned with their public standing. They recognize that erosion of
public support and institutional legitimacy has negative consequences for the Court’s power
and institutional integrity.” Tom S. Clark, The Separation of Powers, Court Curbing, and
Judicial Legitimacy, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 971, 973 (2009).
5
Bill Mears, O’Connor: Don’t Call Us ‘Activist Judges,’ CNN (Nov. 28, 2006, 2:31 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2006/POLITICS/10/27/mears.judicialindependence/index.html [https://
perma.cc/8XLU-EACS] (reporting statements from Justices O’Connor and Breyer about the
importance of judicial independence).
6
Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 315,
315 (1999) (noting that attacks on judicial independence have “become part of orchestrated
strategies of political parties and other groups”).
7
In His Own Words: The President’s Attacks on the Courts, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Feb.
14, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/his-own-words-preside
nts-attacks-courts [https://perma.cc/664M-PZ78]. While much of President Trump’s rhetoric
is unique to him, the amorphous accusation of “judicial activism” has a long history: Republican Party platforms since at least 1996 have insisted that judicial activism is a feature of
judges appointed by Democrats. President George W. Bush campaigned on the promise of
appointing “strict constructionist” judges rather than “liberal activist judges.” Neil S. Siegel,
Interring the Rhetoric of Judicial Activism, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 555, 557–58, 564 (2010).
Accusations of judicial activism come from the political left, as well. Dean Chemerinsky
characterized the Supreme Court’s Citizens United decision as “a stunning example of judicial activism by its five most conservative justices.” Erwin Chemerinsky, Conservatives Embrace Judicial Activism in Campaign Finance Ruling, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2010, 12:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2010-jan-22-la-oe-chemerinsky22-2010jan2
2-story.html [https://perma.cc/A9N2-GDUG]; see also Charles G. Geyh, Judicial Independence, Judicial Accountability, and the Role of Constitutional Norms in Congressional Regu-
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ingly, some commentators have argued that the general public also tends to
view the Supreme Court in partisan terms, reposing their confidence in the
Court when a president from their preferred party successfully appoints a justice and withdrawing their confidence when the appointment is made by a president from the opposing party.8
Even if Roberts’s “balls and strikes” metaphor rings hollow to many,9 there
is widespread agreement that judges should exercise decisional independence
when adjudicating individual disputes.10 However, there is less agreement
about whether the judiciary has or should have institutional independence,11
that is, whether there is some judicial authority that cannot be controlled by the
political branches.12 There are a number of values that have been attributed to
lation of Congress, 78 IND. L.J. 153, 155 (2003) (noting the bipartisan nature of accusations
of judicial activism).
8
Jeffrey M. Jones, Trust in Judicial Branch Up, Executive Branch Down, GALLUP (Sept. 20,
2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/219674/trust-judicial-branch-executive-branch-down.asp
x [https://perma.cc/7BQU-NM49] (“With conservative Justice Neil Gorsuch joining the Supreme Court in April, Republicans’ trust in the judicial branch has surged over the past
year . . . . Democrats are now less trusting in the federal judiciary.”). Scholars debate the extent to which members of the public tend to support the Court even if it does not rule “their
way.” Tara Leigh Grove, The Supreme Court’s Legitimacy Dilemma, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2240, 2252 (2019) (reviewing RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE
SUPREME COURT (2018)).
9
Charles Fried, Balls and Strikes, 61 EMORY L.J. 641, 641 (2012) (“John Roberts has been
both praised and scorned for the metaphor he presented to the Senate Judiciary Committee at
the hearing on his confirmation to be Chief Justice of the United States: ‘[I]t’s my job to call
balls and strikes.’ ”); Jon D. Michaels, Baller Judges, 2020 WIS. L. REV. 411, 413 (“[Judges]
shouldn’t style themselves umpires because, quite frankly, umpire-judging is often impossible in any case involving anything more than fact or credibility adjudication.”).
10
E.g., Vicki C. Jackson, Packages of Judicial Independence: The Selection and Tenure of
Article III Judges, 95 GEO. L.J. 965, 967 (2007) (“[A]ll who act as judges are expected to
exercise independent judgment, in the sense of being impartial as between the parties and not
having a personal stake in the dispute . . . .”); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 962, 965 (2002) (arguing that it is universally agreed that “decisional independence,
meaning judges’ ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in particular cases ‘free from
any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal’ ” is a
virtue).
11
Jackson, supra note 10 (“While all who act as judges are expected to exercise independent
judgment . . . there is disagreement about how independent from the public, or from elected
political branches, judges should be in interpreting and applying the law.”); Geyh, supra note
7, at 160 (“We can only hypothesize as to whether Congress has the power or authority to
punish a judge for making an unpopular decision by labeling it a high misdemeanor and removing her on that basis, or by cutting her budget, or abolishing the judgeship she occupies,
or by depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction . . . .”).
12
Burbank, supra note 6, at 320 (arguing that the standard view of judicial independence
assures that “judges free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to determine whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law”); Charles
Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the Judicial Branch in the
New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 32 (1998) (proposing that judicial review requires
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independence in this institutional sense; most saliently, institutional independence allows judges to uphold rights of citizens against the government13 and
police disputes among its three branches.14 Chief Justice Roberts emphasized
the importance of the institutional independence of the courts as well, explaining that the federal courts are tasked with ensuring that the political branches
act within the confines of the law.15
Despite these justifications for institutional independence, there are also
good reasons for the political branches to exert at least some control over the
judiciary. After all, another way to describe judicial dependence is judicial accountability. Judges are unelected and cannot be removed except under unusual
circumstances; as a result, dependence on the political branches can be seen as
an indispensable mechanism for ensuring that judges apply law that has been
enacted through democratic channels.16 Moreover, it is possible to overstate the
tension between judicial accountability and judicial independence. Professor
Burbank has argued that judicial independence and judicial accountability can
be thought of as “complementary concepts” rather than “concepts at war with
each other.”17
But, no matter whether judicial independence and judicial accountability
are complementary or in tension with one another, the relationship between
these two concepts manifests itself in a number of seemingly intractable conceptual and doctrinal problems. This Article considers one of these perennial
problems: whether Congress may direct a federal court to decide a pending dispute for a particular party. On one hand, the power to write laws for courts to
follow is squarely part of Congress’s lawmaking authority.18 On the other hand,

that “the courts possess the means to protect their institutional integrity against unconstitutional political branch encroachments”).
13
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 968 (“[P]olitical actors face pressures to abandon or
subvert legal rules for legally inappropriate reasons.”); Jackson, supra note 10, at 969 (noting that judges were made independent to, inter alia, “protect minorities from popular passions”).
14
Jackson, supra note 10, at 969 (noting that judges were made independent to, inter alia,
“check the other branches of government when they departed from the fundamental commitments set forth in the Constitution”).
15
University of Minnesota Law School, supra note 3.
16
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (“Yet everyone also agrees that certain forms
of popular or legislative pressure are not only permissible, but indispensable.”); Jackson, supra note 10, at 997 (“Legitimate constitutional government, moreover, requires both independent courts and effective democratic participation in governance.”).
17
Stephen B. Burbank, What Do We Mean by “Judicial Independence”?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J.
323, 325 (2003) (“An accountable judiciary without any independence is weak and feeble.
An independent judiciary without any accountability is dangerous.”).
18
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .”); JAMES E. PFANDER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL
JURISDICTION 405 (3d ed. 2016) (noting that applying rules of decision is precisely what
courts do).
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courts are empowered to adjudicate disputes pending before them.19 Most of the
time, these two powers coexist without any conceptual or practical difficulty:
after Congress writes a generally applicable law, a court applies the law to a
particular factual situation. However, conflict arises when Congress writes a
law that is so narrow that it guarantees the outcome in a particular, pending
case. When it writes a statute with this level of specificity, Congress walks
perilously close to the line that separates the judicial power from the legislative
power.20
Now is the right time to reconsider the fuzzy line separating the legislative
and judicial functions. Widespread criticism of the federal courts, including increasingly pointed accusations of political bias, have precipitated renewed popular and scholarly interest in measures to curb the influence of the federal
courts,21 including proposals to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction over particular subject matters.22 The Supreme Court, too, has waded into the murky
subject of judicial independence in a pair of recent cases, Bank Markazi v. Peterson23 and Patchak v. Zinke.24 In these cases, the Court considered statutes
that explicitly picked a winning party in a pending case and directed the federal
court to rule accordingly. In both of these cases, the Court upheld the statutes.
In doing so, the Court expanded the scope of Congress’s authority to make law
at the expense of the judiciary’s power to adjudicate. How far Congress may
expand its authority at the expense of the judicial power is the subject of this
Article.
In Part I, I will argue that the core of judicial independence is vanishing.
By constitutional design, Congress is firmly in control of the jurisdiction, re-

19

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in . . . inferior Courts . . . .”).
20
For a discussion of the line between the judicial and legislative power, see Evan C.
Zoldan, The Klein Rule of Decision Puzzle and the Self-Dealing Solution, 74 WASH. & LEE.
L. REV. 2133, 2148–72 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, Klein].
21
TOM S. CLARK, THE LIMITS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE 5–6 (2011).
22
Christopher Jon Sprigman, Congress’s Article III Power and the Process of Constitutional
Change, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1778, 1780–81 (2020) (arguing for broad congressional power
under the Exceptions Clause); Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71 VAND. L. REV. 465, 471 (2018) (arguing that political actors treat many
court-curbing measures as out of bounds although this restraint is not compelled by constitutional text, structure, or history); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr. & Atticus DeProspo, Against
Congressional Case Snatching, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 791 (2021) (arguing for a broad
rendering of a principle that prevents Congress from directing federal courts to reach particular judgments in pending cases).
23
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1322–23 (2016). For a discussion and critique
of Bank Markazi, see Evan C. Zoldan, Bank Markazi and the Undervaluation of Legislative
Generality, 35 YALE L. & POL’Y L. REV. INTER ALIA 1, 1 (2016) [hereinafter Zoldan, Bank
Markazi].
24
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 905 (2018).
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sources, and structure of the federal courts.25 Congress’s control is so pervasive,
in fact, that scholars have long struggled to articulate what authority, if any,
stands at the core of the judiciary’s independence.26 After considering different
possible formulations of judicial independence, I conclude that the core of judicial independence should be seen as the courts’ authority to decide disputes
pending before them without legislative direction. This version of the core of
judicial independence comports with persuasive normative accounts of judicial
independence,27 is consistent with the Supreme Court’s prohibition on the revision or reopening of final judgments,28 and is rooted in the “Klein rule of decision” principle, named for a Reconstruction-era case that invalidated an attempt
by Congress to direct the result in pending cases.29 After describing the contours of the core of judicial independence, I will then argue that this core is
vanishing. The modern Supreme Court has narrowed it through a series of doctrinal limitations on its scope, culminating in its Bank Markazi opinion.
In Part II, I will unpack the potential implications of the Court’s Patchak
case on the vanishing core of judicial independence. Patchak’s fractured opinions raise more questions than they answer about the vitality and scope of the
rule of decision principle. I will explore whether Patchak reflects the last gasp
of air for judicial independence or whether, instead, Patchak breathes new life
into its core. Patchak, although it should have been an easy case after Bank
Markazi, unsettles the issues that Bank Markazi seemingly laid to rest. The
Patchak opinions assert, in stark terms, diametrically opposed visions of the
rule of decision principle and judicial independence more generally.
In Part III, I will address the issues that Patchak tees up, but does not settle,
about the scope of the Klein rule of decision principle and, along with it, the
core of judicial independence. After exploring the dispute underlying each of
these issues, I will suggest how the courts, including the Supreme Court, should
25

Geyh, supra note 7, at 160 (arguing that judicial independence “is diminished by Congress’s powers to establish, and by negative implication, disestablish the lower courts, and to
curb the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction”).
26
For thorough discussions of the structural relationships and practices that make up judicial
independence, see Jackson, supra note 10, at 992 (describing the features that make up judicial independence); John Ferejohn, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary: Explaining
Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 353, 355 (1999) (same); Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31–32 (same); ABA COMM’N ON SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUD. INDEP.,
AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY 10–11 (1997) [hereinafter ABA COMM’N].
27
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 366–67 (arguing that judicial independence protects the “rule
of law,” that is, “making sure that powerful people—particularly elected officials—cannot
manipulate legal proceedings to their advantage”).
28
Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 411–12 (1792) (holding that “revision and control”
of federal court judgments by the executive is inconsistent with judicial independence); Plaut
v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc. 514 U.S. 211, 225–26 (1995) (holding that Congress may not require the federal courts to reopen final judgments).
29
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (holding unconstitutional a
withdrawal of jurisdiction “founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes
pending, prescribed by Congress”).
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approach them in a future case. There are no easy answers to the issues raised
in Patchak, but their proper resolution can preserve the core of judicial independence while still recognizing Congress’s lawmaking role.
I.

THE VANISHING CORE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

Judicial independence is easy to praise and difficult to define. It is clear
that no impermeable barrier stands between judges and outside influence; yet,
there is no agreement about whether there are, or should be, any limits to Congress’s ability to control the federal courts. In this Part, I argue that the core of
judicial independence is the power of the courts to decide cases that are pending before them without legislative direction. But, this core of judicial independence is vanishing. The Supreme Court has blurred, if not erased, the line
separating the judicial and legislative functions. Through a series of decisions
upholding statutes that intrude on the power of the courts to decide pending
cases, the Supreme Court has all but ceded the core function of the courts to
Congress.
A. The Core of Judicial Independence
Rather than turning on a single necessary and sufficient feature, judicial independence is better characterized as the product of structures and practices
that describe both judicial behavior and the larger governmental system in
which it resides. As a result, before articulating the core of judicial independence, I begin with a description of its attributes.
1. Attributes of Judicial Independence
Judicial independence is often celebrated as the “backbone of our uniquely
American liberties”30 or even essential to a free society.31 And it is no wonder;
an independent judiciary is believed to protect any number of widely held values. These values are often stated in negative terms—that is—they free judges
from certain unacceptable influences. If judges are financially independent of
the parties whose cases they adjudicate, for example, they can resolve disputes
free of bias caused by self-interest or fear of reprisal.32 Moreover, a judge
30

Joseph M. Hood, Judicial Independence, 23 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDGES 137, 144–
45 (2003).
31
ABA COMM’N, supra note 26, at iii (“Over two hundred years of experience confirm the
wisdom of our nation’s founders that judicial independence is the ‘most essential characteristic of a free society.’ ”).
32
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355 (“[J]udicial independence is the idea that a judge ought to
be free to decide the case before her without fear or anticipation of (illegitimate) punishments or rewards.”); Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31 (“[Judicial] independence
concerns the impartiality of judges—the capacity of individual judges to decide specific cases on the merits, without ‘fear or favor.’ ”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (argu-
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whose position and salary are not dependent on any particular case’s outcome
can render decisions free from political pressure, whether from elected officials
directly33 or from interest groups.34 Stated in positive rather than negative
terms, independent judges are free to interpret the law and decide cases according to the substantive legal commitments embodied in the rules they apply.35
Despite these laudable justifications for an independent judiciary, judicial
independence is not absolute. As scholars have often described, the robustness
of judicial independence turns on whether it refers to the decisional independence of individual judges or the institutional independence of the judicial
branch as a whole.36 A judge has decisional independence to the extent she is
“free to decide the case before her without fear or anticipation of (illegitimate)
punishments or rewards.”37 It is decisional independence that Chief Justice
Roberts invokes when he stresses that judges are merely calling balls and
strikes.38 And it is decisional independence that is questioned when judges are
accused of ruling in line with political biases rather than impartially, on the
facts and law before them.39
ing that judicial independence includes freedom from “any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal”).
33
Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31–32 (arguing that judicial independence protects
the “capacity of the judiciary to remain autonomous, so that it might serve as an effective
check against the excesses of the political branches”).
34
Burbank, supra note 6, at 329 (arguing that judicial independence plays a role in “protecting us from the day-to-day depredations of interest-group politics”); Jackson, supra note 10,
at 969 (noting that judicial independence was intended, in part, to “protect minorities from
popular passions that would violate their legal rights”).
35
Jackson, supra note 10, at 969 (arguing that judges were made independent, in part, “to
judge according to law; they were to have the independence to interpret the law in order to
render judgment”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 967 (arguing that interference
from political actors “threatens to undermine the substantive commitments embodied in law
through partial applications”).
36
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355(“Independence seems to have at least two meanings. One
meaning . . . is that a person is independent if she is able to take actions without fear of interference by another. . . . Another meaning . . . applies naturally to courts and to the judicial
system as a whole.”); Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 31 (“Decisional independence
concerns the impartiality of judges . . . . Branch or institutional independence, on the other
hand, concerns the general, non-case specific separation of the judicial branch . . . .”).
37
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355; see also Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (defining decisional independence as “judges’ ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in
particular cases ‘free from any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including
any fear of reprisal’”).
38
John Roberts Confirmation Hearing, supra note 1 (“Judges are like umpires. Umpires
don’t make the rules, they apply them. . . . [A]nd I will remember that it’s my job to call
balls and strikes, and not to pitch or bat.”); Geyh, supra note 7, at 162 (“If we want judges to
‘call ‘em like they see ‘em’—to decide cases on the basis of facts as they find them and law
as they construe it to be written—then we must insulate them from external influences that
could corrupt their integrity or impartiality.”). Cf. Michaels, supra note 9, at 411, 413.
39
See Eric A. Posner, Does Political Bias in the Judiciary Matter?: Implications of Judicial
Bias Studies for Legal and Constitutional Reform, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 853, 858 (2008) (“Po-
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The decisional independence of individual judges is supported by the Constitution’s salary and tenure protections as well as unwritten cultural norms.40
Once confirmed, Article III of the Constitution provides tenure during “good
behavior” and compensation that cannot be diminished.41 These tenure and salary protections are designed to permit judges to make decisions without fear of
retaliation from the political branches.42 Although tenure is qualified by the
possibility of removal after impeachment and conviction,43 this power is seldom used.44 Indeed, of the thousands of Article III judges who have served
since the beginning of the Republic, only fifteen have been impeached and, of
those, only seven have been removed from office.45
Compared with the decisional independence of individual judges, the institutional independence of the judiciary is far less secure. The judiciary is independent in the institutional sense to the extent that it has authority that cannot
be invaded by the political branches.46 But, because Congress is in control of
litical bias refers to partisan or ideological bias: the desire for an outcome to the left (or
right) of a (stipulated) impartial outcome.”); Jackson, supra note 10, at 967 (“[A]ll who act
as judges are expected to exercise independent judgment, in the sense of being impartial as
between the parties and not having a personal stake in the dispute . . . .”).
40
Grove, supra note 22, at 467–68 (arguing that political actors treat many court-curbing
measures as out of bounds although this restraint is not compelled by constitutional text,
structure, or history).
41
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold
their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a
Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.”); see
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 355 (noting that judges are more or less independent while the
judiciary as an institution is more or less dependent on the political branches).
42
Jackson, supra note 10, at 967 (noting that tenure and salary protections protect judges
from consequences of unpopular decisions).
43
Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives . . . shall have the sole
Power of Impeachment.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments.”).
44
See JOSH CHAFETZ, CONGRESS’S CONSTITUTION 148–50 (2017) (describing impeachment
as a seldom used but important congressional power); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at
980 (“Over the course of American history only thirteen [now fifteen] judges have been impeached and only seven removed from office; four were acquitted and two more resigned
before their trials in the Senate.”).
45
Impeachments of Federal Judges, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
impeachments-federal-judges [https://perma.cc/88S6-M5QY] (listing each impeachment and
conviction of a federal judge). Because the House and Senate could, but do not, use the impeachment and conviction process more aggressively, their forbearance can be seen as part
of the customary independence of the judiciary. See Geyh, supra note 7, at 158 (noting the
“gradual decline over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the acceptability of holding
the judiciary accountable for its decisions by means of impeachment . . . .”). Professor Grove
has pointed out that some judges might resign rather than face the impeachment process.
46
Burbank, supra note 6, at 320 (arguing that the standard view of judicial independence
assures that “judges free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to determine whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law”); Geyh &
Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 32 (proposing that judicial review requires that “the courts
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the budget, jurisdiction, and structure of the federal courts, the judiciary as a
branch is better described as largely dependent on Congress rather than independent of it.47 Although the Constitution, not Congress, creates the Supreme
Court,48 it is Congress that decides whether to create lower federal courts, how
to arrange them, how many judges will be appointed to them, and whether to
abolish them.49 Congress also has the power to grant jurisdiction to50 and withdraw jurisdiction from,51 lower federal courts.52 Moreover, although judges
have the power to issue final judgments, they must rely on the executive for enforcement.53

possess the means to protect their institutional integrity against unconstitutional political
branch encroachments”).
47
Geyh, supra note 7, at 163 (“The judiciary’s institutional independence is, therefore, more
closely circumscribed by accountability-promoting mechanisms for congressional control of
the judiciary’s budget, structure, administration and jurisdiction.”).
48
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.”).
49
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 359 (“The Constitution gives Congress the authority to create
(or not create) federal courts other than the Supreme Court, to create and regulate their jurisdictions, to decide how many federal judges there will be . . . .”). Congress famously used its
power over the structure and existence of the courts to repeal the Judiciary Act of 1801, including eliminating judgeships. Jackson, supra note 10, at 991 (“Yet after the Jeffersonians’
ascent to power, in 1802 Congress enacted a statute to repeal legislation from the closing
days of the Adams Administration that had created several new judgeships (filled with Federalist appointees); it thus effectively abolished Article III judgeships.”).
50
Jackson, supra note 10, at 992 (“[Congress] has broad powers to control the jurisdiction
of the federal courts . . . .”); Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 986 (“[E]ven the most
aggressive readings of Article III recognize that Congress has wide latitude to regulate the
business of the federal courts.”).
51
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 988 (“Congress routinely dispossesses federal
courts of authority to hear cases or award remedies because of concern for how the judges
might rule, or in order to circumscribe their ability to interfere with congressional objectives.”). Moreover, in limited circumstances, Congress can also cut the courts out of the decision to imprison by suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 9 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
52
Whether Congress can withdraw jurisdiction without limit is another question, and one
that is the subject of this Article. See Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa
2020: What The Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 29 (2019) (“[T]he Court –
a coordinate branch of the national government – will excise subject-matter limitations on its
appellate jurisdiction when a substantial, undefended purpose of such jurisdiction-stripping
legislation is to limit the Court’s ability to consider a properly preserved constitutional
claim.”). Cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that the Court
will not look for Congress’s motivation when it withdraws jurisdiction).
53
BENJAMIN GINSBERG, PRESIDENTIAL GOVERNMENT 285 (2016) (noting that federal courts
generally must turn to executive agencies or the President to enforce judgments); see also
Burbank, supra note 6, at 323–24 (noting that the President has only rarely refused to execute federal court judgments).
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While Congress may not diminish the salaries of sitting federal judges, it
can increase their workload by failing to appoint new judges to overloaded
courts54 and by cutting funding for court clerks, court security, and information
technology.55 Conversely, Congress can reduce the influence of Article III
courts by creating other institutions with the power to interpret federal law, like
administrative agencies and legislative courts, and vesting them with authority
to resolve vast numbers of legal disputes that otherwise would fall to Article III
courts.56
Perhaps most fundamentally, federal courts are dependent on Congress for
providing them the law to apply.57 Courts are constrained not only by substan-

54

ALICIA BANNON, BRENNAN CTR. JUST., THE IMPACT OF JUDICIAL VACANCIES ON FEDERAL
TRIAL COURTS, 1–2 (2014), https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/publications/Im
pact%20of%20Judicial%20Vacancies%20072114.pdf [https://perma.cc/X36K-AAHG] (arguing that sustained vacancies in federal trial courts leads to judicial burn-out, delays, less
time spent on each case, and increased administrative burdens).
55
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 985 (“Judges must worry about funds to keep this
machine running and, especially, to hire capable staff and supply them with adequate resources (which include computer and research support, courthouse security, storage facilities, press offices, and much more).”); see also JOHN G. ROBERTS, 2013 YEAR-END REPORT
ON THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–6, https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2013ye
ar-endreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/J3MQ-8LWC] (noting that sequestration of funds had a
deleterious effect on the administration of the federal courts, including leading to fewer public defenders, decreasing court security, and delaying trials).
56
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 989 (“[F]ederal lawmakers have constituted a variety of non-Article III tribunals—so-called legislative or Article I courts—to adjudicate federal
claims and interpret and apply federal law.”). For example, the United States Court of Federal Claims, a legislative court, shares jurisdiction with the district courts over suits for money
against the government. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)–(b). Bankruptcy Courts, also legislative courts,
hear suits that otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of district courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 151, 1334
(the former creating bankruptcy courts within district courts and the latter granting jurisdiction to district courts).
57
See PFANDER, supra note 18, at 405 (noting that applying rules of decision is precisely
what courts do).

21 NEV. L.J. 531

Spring 2021] VANISHING CORE OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE

543

tive law,58 but also the evidentiary59 and procedural60 rules that Congress
writes.61
Considering the differences between decisional independence and institutional independence, scholars largely have concluded that judicial independence means something very different in the context of individual judges than it
does for the judiciary as an institution. As Professors Ferejohn and Kramer put
it, the federal system “protects individual judges from direct outside interference while making the institution in which they work vulnerable to control by
the political branches of government.”62
Although the dichotomy between decisional and institutional independence
is a useful heuristic, the line separating these concepts “often blurs in application,” as Professor Geyh has noted.63 In this view, incursions on the courts’ institutional independence can have ripple effects on the decisional independence
of individual judges. For example, if Congress threatens to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts over a politically sensitive subject matter, then individual judges may be inclined, in a particular case, to reach a conclusion that
protects the judiciary as an institution. Indeed, research suggests that the Supreme Court does voluntarily diminish its own power in response to threats of
“Court-curbing” legislation, that is, “legislative attempts to limit or remove the
Supreme Court’s power.”64

58

Pamela S. Karlan, Judicial Independences, 95 GEO. L.J. 1041, 1049 (2007) (“[T]he job of
the courts is to vindicate the statutory scheme enacted by the legislature.”); Zoldan, Klein,
supra note 20, at 2150 (“As a number of scholars have recognized, writing rules of decision
for courts to follow—that is, writing the substantive law—is precisely what a legislature
does.”).
59
Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2150 (“Congress can, and does, write rules of evidence,
defining what is relevant, what is admissible and inadmissible, and who is competent to give
testimony.”); see also Act of Jan. 2, 1975, Pub. L. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926 (establishing and enacting the Federal Rules of Evidence).
60
E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (authorizing federal courts to issue writs); 28 U.S.C. § 1696
(providing for service of process in foreign and international litigation); 28 U.S.C. § 1713
(providing rules for class actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1863 (establishing standards for jury selection); 28 U.S.C. § 1914 (setting out district court filing fees).
61
Although Congress does create evidentiary and procedural rules itself, it also can, and
does, delegate authority to the courts to write them. 28 U.S.C. § 2072.
62
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 964; see also Geyh, supra note 7, at 163 (“The net
effect . . . is a system of (more or less) independent judges, superimposed on a (more or less)
dependent judiciary.”). On the historical origins of the distinction between decisional and
institutional independence, see Jack N. Rakove, The Original Justifications for Judicial Independence, 95 GEO. L.J. 1061, 1063 (2007) (“Securing the independence of individual
judges, however, did not mean that the judiciary had become a separate department of government.”).
63
Charles Gardner Geyh, Judicial Independence as an Organizing Principle, 10 ANN. REV.
L. & SOC. SCI. 185, 192 (2014).
64
CLARK, supra note 21, at 25.
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2. The Core of Judicial Independence
Considering the imperfect way that the judiciary is protected from political
influence, some scholars have concluded that the independence of the judiciary
is more mythical than real.65 Nevertheless, there is also a long scholarly tradition of searching for the core of judicial independence—that is—some function
of the judiciary that the political branches may not lawfully invade.66 After describing the parameters of the debate, I offer and defend a vision of the core of
judicial independence.
a. Competing Visions of the Core of Judicial Independence
Professor Burbank argues that “the core of federal judicial independence is
freedom of judicial decisions from control by the executive or legislative
branches.”67 While acknowledging that “control” is an indeterminate concept,
Burbank notes that the range of debate over the core of judicial independence is
quite narrow.68 As he notes, it is widely accepted that Congress lacks the power
to reopen final judgments.69 Moreover, it is also widely accepted that Congress
has the power to change the law prospectively.70 As a result, he argues, the debate over the core of the judiciary’s independence should be limited to “(1) the
judicial power to interpret and implement the Constitution, and (2) the irreducible powers of federal courts to act as such.”71
Much of the current debate over the core of judicial independence takes
place in the range that Burbank sets out, focusing on the scope of Congress’s
power to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts under the Constitution’s

65

See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: Constitutional and Political
Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 700, 702–03 (1995) (arguing that judicial independence is limited to good behavior and compensation clauses).
66
See, e.g., Geyh & Van Tassel, supra note 12, at 86 (“The Framers neither considered nor
guarded against other, more speculative political branch encroachments upon the judiciary’s
institutional autonomy . . . .”). For an assessment of the relationship between de jure and de
facto judicial independence, see James Melton & Tom Ginsburg, Does De Jure Judicial Independence Really Matter?, J.L. & CTS., Fall 2014, at 187, 190 (“Judicial independence is a
complex and contested concept, but at its core, it involves the ability and willingness of
courts to decide cases in light of the law without undue regard to the views of other government actors.”).
67
Burbank, supra note 6, at 331.
68
Id. at 335.
69
Id. at 325 (citing Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211 (1995), for the proposition that Congress cannot reopen final judgments).
70
Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 484 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (“A legislature . . . may prescribe a new rule for future cases.”)); see also Zoldan,
Klein, supra note 20, at 2150 (“[W]riting rules of decision for courts to follow—that is, writing the substantive law—is precisely what a legislature does.”).
71
Burbank, supra note 6, at 325–26.
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Exceptions Clause.72 Ex Parte McCardle73 can be taken to stand for the proposition that Congress’s Exceptions Clause power is nearly unlimited, even if the
result is to direct a federal court to reach a particular conclusion in a pending
case.74 However, Professor Monaghan reads the Exceptions Clause more narrowly, arguing that Congress may run afoul of Article III by withdrawing federal court jurisdiction for the purpose of defeating judicial review of constitutional claims. He predicts that “the Court—a coordinate branch of the national
government—will excise subject-matter limitations on its appellate jurisdiction
when a substantial, undefended purpose of such jurisdiction-stripping legislation is to limit the Court’s ability to consider a properly preserved constitutional
claim.”75 Importantly, Monaghan stops short of extending this prediction to
statutory claims. Instead, he suggests that Congress might be justified in upholding a statute that strips jurisdiction when no constitutional rights are at
stake.76
Other scholars have read the Exceptions Clause either more broadly or
more narrowly than Monaghan. Some have argued that Congress may not enact
a statute that tells the federal courts how to rule in a particular case, even in the
context of purely statutory claims.77 By contrast, a number of scholars view
Congress’s power under the Exceptions Clause more broadly. Professor Sprigman argues that Congress may strip jurisdiction from the federal courts even
over claims asserting violations of the Constitution.78 In this way, Sprigman
concludes, Congress may “displace a judicial interpretation of the Constitution’s meaning with its own.”79 Professor Grove makes the related point that,
unlike some incursions on judicial independence, there is not a broad political

72

Krotoszynski & DeProspo, supra note 22 (arguing for a broad rendering of a principle
that prevents Congress from directing federal courts to reach particular judgments in pending
cases); Evan H. Caminker, Schiavo and Klein, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 529, 542–43 (2005)
(arguing that Congress has the constitutional power to direct a federal court decision provided that it is framed in a particular way); see also Howard M. Wasserman, The Irrepressible
Myth of Klein, 79 U. CIN. L. REV. 53, 53–56 (2010).
73
Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (holding that the Court will not
consider Congress’s motivation when it withdraws jurisdiction).
74
Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2159 n.159 (describing the tension between McCardle
and a principle that Congress may not direct a federal court to reach a particular decision in a
pending case).
75
Monaghan, supra note 52, at 29.
76
Id. at 67 (noting that jurisdiction stripping in the statutory context presents different issues
than in the constitutional context and “[p]erhaps . . . should be upheld”).
77
E.g., Krotoszynski & DeProspo, supra note 22 (arguing for a broad rendering of a principle that prevents Congress from directing federal courts to reach particular judgments in
pending cases).
78
Sprigman, supra note 22 (arguing for broad congressional power under the Exceptions
Clause).
79
Id.
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consensus against jurisdiction-stripping.80 She concludes that attempts by the
political branches to strip the federal courts of jurisdiction, even over constitutional questions, may be met with little popular resistance, even if the political
process presents additional barriers.81
b. A Proposed Core of Judicial Independence
I propose that the core of judicial independence is the authority of the federal courts to adjudicate specific legal disputes that have been presented to
them free from legislative direction. In this proposal, Congress has broad authority to set policy by writing rules of decision for courts to follow. However,
the court should not apply a change in law to a pending case when Congress
has failed to address a governmental objective other than merely resolving
pending cases.82 Moreover, the courts must apply a generally applicable law,
but not a law that creates special exemptions for a closed class of identifiable
individuals.83 In addition, Congress may withdraw jurisdiction over a class of
cases, even if some of those cases are pending. But, the court should not give
effect to a withdrawal of jurisdiction if the only result is the termination of
pending cases.84 Finally, Congress has wide latitude to assert the government’s
sovereign immunity. However, a court should not recognize an assertion of
sovereign immunity that is better characterized as governmental self-dealing.85
My proposed formulation is largely within the range of debate over the
core of judicial independence articulated by Professor Burbank. In a sense, my
formulation can be considered a gloss on Burbank’s proposition that the federal
courts must have the irreducible power to act as federal courts. My formulation
complements the proposal offered by Professor Monaghan; but, it is perhaps
more protective of judicial independence because it suggests a limitation on
Congress’s power over the jurisdiction of the courts in both statutory and con80

Grove, supra note 22, at 471, 518 (noting that there is no bipartisan norm that jurisdictionstripping is “off the wall”).
81
Id. at 523 (noting that modern attempts at jurisdiction stripping have been unsuccessful);
see also Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 870–74, 886 (2011) (describing how political actors have used normal legislative
processes to block jurisdiction-stripping measures). A number of scholars have argued for a
narrow, but more definite, core of judicial independence centered around the court’s practices and procedures. See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Unconstitutional Rulemaking: The Civil Justice Reform Act and Separation of Powers, 77 MINN. L. REV. 1283, 1322 (1993) (“[T]he theory of inherent court power nonetheless requires that congressional involvement in
rulemaking acknowledge the ‘significance of a certain degree of judicial autonomy’ over
internal court rules of practice and procedure.”); Paul D. Carrington, A New Confederacy?
Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 972–73 (1996) (“[T]here is a core of
control vested in the Supreme Court that is beyond the constitutional reach of Congress.”).
82
See infra Section III.A.
83
See infra Section III.B.
84
See infra Section III.C.
85
See infra Section III.D.
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stitutional cases. Moreover, my proposal, unlike Monaghan’s, does not turn on
finding an illicit motive on the part of Congress. Similarly, my conception of
the core of judicial independence is more protective of the judiciary than the
vision advanced by Professor Sprigman. Sprigman does not distinguish between Congress’s power over general policy matters and matters affecting identifiable individuals; in my view, by contrast, Congress should have less leeway
to legislate for an identifiable individual than it does for a class of indeterminate membership.86 As described below, there are normative, structural, and
doctrinal justifications for preserving the core of judicial independence as I
have described it.
First, allowing the courts to adjudicate specific legal disputes that have
been presented to them without legislative direction vindicates persuasive normative views about the goals of an independent judiciary. Elaborating on the
values protected by judicial independence, Professor Ferejohn argues that it
protects the “rule of law,” by which he means “making sure that powerful people—particularly elected officials—cannot manipulate legal proceedings to
their advantage.”87 In addition, without judicial independence, he argues, government officials “may interfere in the enforcement of statutes enacted by previous legislatures without bothering to go through procedural formalities.”88
Preserving the core of judicial independence as I describe it—that is, the
courts’ ability to actually decide cases pending before them—protects the values identified by Professor Ferejohn. If courts retain the power to decide cases
pending before them, then they can ignore elected officials’ attempts to manipulate legal proceedings to reach a result that favors them in a particular pending
case. Moreover, if courts have the power to decide pending cases, then they can
prevent Congress from effectively changing the substantive law in particular
cases in the guise of altering jurisdictional rules.
The values that Professor Ferejohn describes are similar to an argument in
The Dialogue, Professor Henry Hart’s foundational essay on federal court jurisdiction.89 In The Dialogue, one of Hart’s speakers argues that Article III can
be read to create a space for a federal court not just to declare one party to a
case the winner, but actually, acting like a court, to decide the case. In his
words, “if Congress directs an Article III court to decide a case, I can easily
read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court how
to decide it.”90 Protecting the core of judicial independence, as I define it, supports the value identified in Hart’s Dialogue. Preventing Congress from directing a court to pick the winner and loser in a particular pending case preserves
86

See infra Sections III.A–B.
Ferejohn, supra note 26, at 366.
88
Id. at 367.
89
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts:
An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1372–73 (1953).
90
Id. at 1373.
87

21 NEV. L.J. 531

548

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:2

the court’s ability to act like a court, including its power to make factual findings and draw legal conclusions that bear on the outcome of the case.91 Moreover, insulating a court’s ability to adjudicate particular, pending cases allows
the court to proceed according to known procedural rules, a valued characteristic of courts.92 Conversely, if Congress could interfere in a pending case to direct the court to declare one litigant a winner, the court’s normal procedural
rules, findings of fact, and legal conclusions are all made irrelevant to the
judgment it renders.
Framed another way, the courts’ ability to decide cases pending before
them can be considered the core of judicial independence because it protects
values associated with both institutional and decisional independence.93 Preserving the case-adjudicating function of the courts protects the judiciary’s institutional independence by placing a limit on Congress’s otherwise unlimited
power to arrange federal court jurisdiction under the Exceptions Clause. Allowing courts to disregard some congressional limits on their jurisdiction in pending cases secures for them a measure of freedom from political interference.94
Perhaps less obviously, preventing Congress from directing the result in
pending cases also protects the decisional independence of individual judges.
When Congress threatens to withdraw jurisdiction from the courts in a way that
would terminate pending cases, the judges considering those cases are made
acutely aware of the political salience of their pending decisions. It is likely that
a judge who knows a case on her docket has been targeted by Congress will
feel pressure to rule in a way that comports with the threatened jurisdictional
tinkering. This kind of outside political pressure, whether effective or not in
any given case, compromises the value of decisional independence, which requires freedom from “outside pressure: personal, economic, or political.”95
Second, preserving the courts’ ability to decide cases pending before them
is consistent with the Supreme Court’s treatment of the political branches’ at91

Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 563
(2007) (“[T]he sort of finality that is typically associated with judicial decisions” includes
the powers “to make factual findings that courts are bound to accept in subsequent litigation,
or to resolve legal disputes.”).
92
See Mullenix, supra note 81, at 1322 (“[T]he theory of inherent court power nonetheless
requires that congressional involvement in rulemaking acknowledge the ‘significance of a
certain degree of judicial autonomy’ over internal court rules of practice and procedure.”).
93
Geyh, supra note 63, at 185, 192 (noting the potential overlap between institutional and
decisional independence). A special thanks to Charles Geyh and Henry Monaghan for suggesting this line of inquiry.
94
Burbank, supra note 6, at 320 (arguing that the standard view of judicial independence
assures that “judges free of congressional and executive control will be in a position to determine whether the assertion of power against the citizen is consistent with law”).
95
Ferejohn & Kramer, supra note 10, at 965 (defining decisional independence as “judges’
ability to adjudicate facts and interpret law in particular cases ‘free from any outside pressure: personal, economic, or political, including any fear of reprisal’ ”); see also Ferejohn,
supra note 26, at 355.
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tempts to control judicial outcomes after judgment. Hayburn’s Case has long
stood for the proposition that a statute may not constitutionally vest authority in
the judiciary to enter judgment if that judgment can later be revised by executive action.96 Analogously, in Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, the Court clarified that
Congress may not direct a federal court to reopen judgments that have already
been finalized.97
A parallel can be drawn between the Court’s prohibition on political interference with final judgments and my proposal for a prohibition on legislative
direction of judicial outcomes before judgment.98 Whether before or after
judgment, political interference can deprive the court of its power to actually
decide a case, as Hart explained.99 In both circumstances, the judicial process is
mooted by political considerations and the court’s law-application process is
disconnected from the result: in short, political interference, whether before or
after judgment, makes the court all-but-superfluous to a case’s outcome.
Indeed, in one respect, the comparison between pre- and post-judgment political interference suggests that the Court should be more suspicious of prejudgment interference. When the executive revises, or Congress reopens, a federal court judgment, at least it is clear that the court’s judgment and the political reaction to it are two different events. From a political accountability perspective, then, the public could reward or punish political actors for whatever
position they took on the court’s underlying decision. By contrast, when Congress directs courts to enter judgment for one of the parties in a pending case,
the public cannot know how the case would have come out in the absence of
the political interference. As a result, the electorate cannot know whether the
result is purely a function of a political act, or instead, whether the court would
have reached the same result in the absence of political interference.100
96

Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792) (holding that “revision and control” of
federal court judgments by the executive is inconsistent with judicial independence). More
clearly, the Court has held that constitutional courts may “render no judgments not binding
and conclusive on the parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.” Chi. & S. Airline v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–14 (1948).
97
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 227 (1995) (holding that Congress may not
require the federal courts to reopen final judgments). Cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327,
346–47 (2000) (upholding a statute that revised final judgments, temporarily, for the purpose
of facilitating other changes that were the main purpose of the law).
98
Gordon G. Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WIS. L. REV. 1189, 1243–44 (1981) (arguing
that Klein represents an extension of the principle against nonjudicial revision of court
judgments).
99
See Hart, supra note 89 at 1373 (“[I]f Congress directs an Article III court to decide a
case, I can easily read into Article III a limitation on the power of Congress to tell the court
how to decide it.”).
100
See Martin H. Redish & Christopher R. Pudelski, Legislative Deception, Separation of
Powers, and the Democratic Process: Harnessing the Political Theory of United States v.
Klein, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 437, 438–40 (2006) (arguing that Klein can be read to require the
judiciary to prevent Congress from deceiving the electorate). I do not make the broader
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Third, formulating the core of judicial independence as the power of courts
to actually decide cases pending before them without legislative direction gives
modern meaning to the Reconstruction-era case of United States v. Klein, the
Supreme Court’s first—and as it turns out its last—strong statement defending
a court’s power to actually decide pending cases.101 In Klein, the Supreme
Court invalidated a statute that withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts in
a group of pending cases, holding that it violated the principle of separation of
powers. Specifically, the Court held that Congress unconstitutionally encroached on the judicial power because its withdrawal of jurisdiction was
“founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”102
The Klein “rule of decision” principle, as this curious statement is called,
has intrigued scholars for generations,103 but there has been little agreement
about exactly what, if anything, Klein prohibits.104 Despite disagreement about
its contours,105 Klein is the strongest doctrinal source for my definition of the
claim that the public actually would tend to be aware of decisions of the courts or the political branches.
101
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871) (invalidating statute that withdrew jurisdiction “founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in causes pending,
prescribed by Congress”).
102
Id. at 146–47.
103
Some scholars have searched for a principle that is largely consistent with not only Klein
but also other rule of decision principle cases. Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2194–208
(arguing that Klein reflects a principle against government self-dealing); Young, supra note
98, at 1244 (arguing that Klein represents an extension of the principle against nonjudicial
revision of court judgments). Others suggest that Klein is a reminder of important but unenforceable constitutional values. Caminker, supra note 72, at 542-43 (arguing that Klein is a
rule of “drafting etiquette” that does not actually prevent Congress from directing a decision,
only phrasing its direction in a particular way); see also Wasserman, supra note 72, at 85
(“Klein does no more than Marbury and dozens of cases in which the Court has struck down
substantive federal statutory law as violating individual constitution rights.”). Still others
suggest that Klein stands for no coherent principle about the line between the legislature and
the judiciary and should be ignored. Adrian Vermeule, The Judicial Power in the State (and
Federal) Courts, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 357, 380–81.
104
Klein is so vexing because it seems both intuitively correct and literally false. On one
hand, by preventing Congress from dictating a rule of decision in a pending case, Klein preserves judicial independence by creating space for the courts actually to decide cases pending before them. On the other hand, Klein seems to conflict with longstanding precedent that
requires courts to apply the law as Congress writes it, even if that means applying a newly
enacted law to a case on appeal from a final judgment. United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109–10 (1801) (“[When] subsequent to the judgment, and before the
decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed . . . .”).
105
There are many possible things wrong with the statute invalidated in Klein. These have
been identified by other scholars and I have explained and questioned them in previous
work. These include: the fact that Congress provided a rule of decision for the court to follow, the specificity of the statute, the retroactivity of the statute, the political motivation underlying the statute, the fact that the statute may have required the Court to reach an other-
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core of judicial independence because it suggests that, at least in some circumstances, Congress may not intercede in a pending federal case without violating
the Constitution. As a result, the core of the institutional independence of the
judiciary, as a doctrinal matter, rests on the viability of some formulation of
Klein. In the rest of this Part, I describe the Klein case and explain how the
modern Supreme Court has chipped away at its meaning, and along with it, the
core of judicial independence.
B. The Vanishing Core of Judicial Independence
Because Klein’s holding resists easy generalization into a broader principle, recounting the unusual posture of the case helps clarify its possible reach.
After describing Klein, I will demonstrate how its rule of decision principle,
along with the core of judicial independence, has been eroded.
1. Klein’s Rule of Decision Principle
Klein arose out of a Civil War-era statute that permitted federal agents to
seize and sell abandoned or captured civilian property confiscated in areas rebelling against the United States.106 In order to facilitate the recovery of damages by loyal residents of rebellious areas, Congress permitted claimants to
bring suit against the United States for the value of confiscated property so long
as the claimant demonstrated that he had “never given any aid or comfort to the
present rebellion.”107 In United States v. Padelford, the Supreme Court interpreted the compensation statute broadly, holding that even a person who had
committed a disloyal act would be eligible to recover the value of his property
so long as he later took an oath of loyalty pursuant to a presidential pardon.108
In a scenario similar to Padelford, a man named Wilson, whose property
was confiscated and sold by the Union, took an oath of loyalty.109 After Wilson’s death, Klein, the executor of his estate, relied on this oath and Padelford’s broad reading of the compensation statute to prevail in a suit against the
United States.110 While Klein’s case was pending on the government’s appeal,
Congress passed an appropriations bill funding judgments rendered against the
United States by the Court of Claims.111 The appropriations bill, however, also
wise unconstitutional result, and the fact that it inured to the benefit of the government.
Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2150.
106
Abandoned and Captured Property Act of 1863, ch. 120, § 1, 12 Stat. 820, 820.
107
Id. § 3.
108
United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531, 543 (1869) (broadly interpreting the
Abandoned and Captured Property Act).
109
Amanda L. Tyler, The Story of Klein: The Scope of Congress’s Authority to Shape the
Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 87, 91–92 (Vicki C. Jackson
& Judith Resnik eds., 2010).
110
Id. at 92–94.
111
Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, § 1, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
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contained a proviso that specifically disallowed proof of a loyalty oath to serve
as the basis for recovering the value of confiscated property.112 Instead, the
proviso made evidence that a person took a loyalty oath pursuant to a presidential pardon conclusive proof of disloyalty, directed the trial court to dismiss
these claims, and withdrew jurisdiction from the Supreme Court over claims in
which the claimant had previously prevailed based on evidence of a loyalty
oath.113
In Klein, the Supreme Court invalidated the proviso because its withdrawal
of jurisdiction was “founded solely on the application of a rule of decision, in
causes pending, prescribed by Congress.”114 Because of the opacity of this language, and the Court’s refusal to strike down any other statutes under Klein, the
contours of the rule of decision principle have remained somewhat of a mystery. Although the Court has not relied on the Klein rule of decision principle to
invalidate any other statute, it has made offhanded references to the case a few
times, suggesting the viability of some principle rooted in the case.115 In the absence of concrete Supreme Court guidance, theories about the health and scope
of Klein have flourished.
2. The Evisceration of Klein
It was only in the modern era that the Court explicitly began to chip away
at the rule of decision principle by slowly conforming it to the earlier case of
Schooner Peggy.116 In Schooner Peggy, the Court upheld the application of a
newly enacted law on appeal, even though the trial court correctly applied the
old law at the trial stage. The Court held that, when “subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the [new] law must be obeyed . . . .”117
This requirement is often referred to as the “Changed Law Rule.”118
Klein (which post-dates Schooner Peggy) can be read as an exception to
the Changed Law Rule, preventing the application of new law to pending cases
in certain circumstances. Read in this way, the Klein rule of decision principle
and the Changed Law Rule can coexist, neither swallowing the other, so long
112

Tyler, supra note 109, at 93–94.
Id. at 94.
114
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
115
United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 403–05 (1980) (mentioning
Klein); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1944) (same).
116
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801).
117
Id. at 110.
118
PETER GERANGELOS, THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND LEGISLATIVE INTERFERENCE IN
JUDICIAL PROCESS: CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES AND LIMITATIONS 181–83 (2009) (referring
to the Changed Law Rule); J. Richard Doidge, Note, Is Purely Retroactive Legislation Limited by the Separation of Powers?: Rethinking United States v. Klein, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
910, 959–60 (1994) (same).
113
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as the rule of decision principle is narrower than the Changed Law Rule. By
many accounts, however, if the Changed Law Rule is an exception to Klein, the
Changed Law Rule swallows Klein altogether.119 Professor Araiza expressed
this view when describing the vitality of Klein: “if lawmaking is the power to
create liability rules and the procedural structure for enforcing those rules, then
overturning a statutory interpretation and amending the underlying statute both
constitute lawmaking.”120 In this view, there is no space between “amending
applicable law,” which is permissible under Schooner Peggy, and “prescribing
a rule of decision in causes pending,” which is prohibited under Klein.
The modern evisceration of the rule of decision principle resulted from the
inversion of the relationship between Klein and Schooner Peggy, making the
Changed Law Rule an exception to the rule of decision principle rather than the
other way around. The evisceration proceeded in three stages: first as a suggestion, next as dictum, and finally as a holding.
a. Stage 1: The Suggestion
In stage one, the Court suggested that Schooner Peggy’s Changed Law
Rule was an exception to the rule of decision principle. The statute considered
in Robertson v. Seattle Audubon modified and codified an agreement between
the United States Bureau of Land Management (BLM) and the state of Oregon
over logging rights and the conservation of spotted owls.121 In order to help enforce the new policy, the statute, known as the Northwest Timber Compromise,
provided that a group of lawsuits brought by logging and conservation groups
would be dismissed so long as BLM abided by the terms of the Compromise.122
The Court upheld the district court’s dismissal of the named, pending cases because the Compromise amended the statutory provisions that formed the basis
for the pending suits.123 Although it did not squarely address the issue, the
Court, for the first time, suggested that the Changed Law Rule was an exception to Klein, noting in passing that Congress may always amend or repeal existing law, even for the purpose of ending ongoing litigation.124

119

Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct 1310, 1335 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“Saying Congress ‘creates new law’ in one case but not another simply expresses a conclusion on
that issue . . . .”); William D. Araiza, The Trouble with Robertson: Equal Protection, the
Separation of Powers, and the Line Between Statutory Amendment and Statutory Interpretation, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 1055, 1104–06 (1999).
120
Araiza, supra note 119, at 1079.
121
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 432 (1992).
122
Id. at 439–40 (recounting the circumstances surrounding the Northwest Timber Compromise).
123
Id. at 441.
124
Id. (“Because we conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) did amend applicable law, we need
not consider whether this reading of Klein is correct.”).
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b. Stage 2: The Dictum
Stage two of the evisceration of the rule of decision principle was the
Court’s assertion that the Changed Law Rule is an exception to it rather than
the other way around. In Plaut, the Court invalidated legislation that reopened a
class of final judgments.125 The Court did not rest on Klein, however, instead
articulating a new separation-of-powers-based restriction on reopening final
judgments.126 As for Klein, the Court asserted that the rule of decision principle
did not apply because “its prohibition does not take hold when Congress
amends applicable law.”127 Because the statute in Plaut changed the substantive
legal standard for the judiciary to apply, the Court noted, it changed the law
within the meaning of Klein, rendering Klein inapplicable.128
c.

Stage 3: The Holding

Stage three of the evisceration of the rule of decision principle was the
Court’s explicit reliance on the Changed Law Rule as an exception to the application of Klein. In Bank Markazi v. Peterson,129 claimants brought suit against
the country of Iran for damages arising from injuries and deaths caused by
state-sponsored terrorist acts.130 Although claimants were awarded judgments
amounting to billions of dollars, these judgments could not be satisfied by assets located in the United States.131 The claimants filed actions, later consolidated into single case, against Bank Markazi, the Central Bank of Iran. Under
generally applicable law, however, Bank Markazi, as a Central Bank, could not
be reached to satisfy the existing default judgments against Iran.132 In response,
Congress enacted a statute permitting claims against Iran to be satisfied by the
assets of Bank Markazi. The statute explicitly named the pending case against
Bank Markazi and provided that it applied to that case and none other.133
Before the Supreme Court, Bank Markazi argued that the statute violated
Klein’s rule of decision principle because it prescribed a rule that applied to a
125

Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995).
Id. at 219 (“By retroactively commanding the federal courts to reopen final judgments,
Congress has violated this fundamental principle [of separation of powers].”).
127
Id. at 218 (internal quotation marks omitted).
128
Id.
129
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016).
130
Id. at 1319 (setting out statutory framework at issue in Bank Markazi).
131
Id. at 1317–18 (describing statutory barriers to execution of judgments).
132
Id. at 1318 (describing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act shields property of a
foreign central bank from execution).
133
Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, Pub. L. 112-158, § 502, 126
Stat. 1214, 1258–60 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 8772) (authorizing attachment of
“financial assets that are identified in and the subject of proceedings in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York in Peterson et al. v. Islamic Republic of
Iran et al.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1611(b)(1).
126
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single pending case, indeed, one identified in the statute itself.134 The Court rejected the argument, holding that the statute did not violate Klein. By permitting claimants to reach assets of one entity to satisfy judgments owed by another, Congress had amended applicable law, the Court reasoned, making Klein’s
restrictions inapplicable.135
After Bank Markazi, it appeared that the rule of decision principle had been
swallowed whole by the Changed Law Rule. As Chief Justice Roberts noted in
his Bank Markazi dissent, a Changed Law Rule exception to Klein is coextensive with Klein itself: “[c]hanging the law is simply how Congress acts.”136 If
this view is correct—if every statute “changes the law” within the meaning of
Klein—then Klein never applies in the only circumstance in which it might apply, that is, when Congress writes new law for the court to apply to a pending
case.
Bank Markazi’s definitive restatement of the relationship between the
Changed Law Rule and the rule of decision principle is more than a fine doctrinal point. It is a remarkable (re)statement of the relationship between the federal courts and Congress. Although the branches have never been hermetically
sealed from one another,137 Klein seemed to stand for the proposition that there
was some core of judicial power that Congress could not (or at least would not)
invade. The viability of Klein, therefore, is of the gravest consequence to the
independence of the judiciary. Without a core power to decide cases pending
before it, it is hard to articulate what is left of the judiciary’s independence
from Congress.
Bank Markazi’s summary treatment of the rule of decision principle
seemed to spell the end of Klein and the independence of the judiciary. But just
as the restraining power of Klein has long been exaggerated,138 its death may be
exaggerated as well; the Court’s decision in Patchak v. Zinke139 has unsettled
the issues that Bank Markazi seemed to have resolved. Patchak’s fractured
opinions set out competing visions of Klein and raise the possibility that the
rule of decision principle (including the core of judicial independence) has
some life in it yet. Part II describes Patchak, a puzzling case that can be read
either as the last gasp of breath for judicial independence or, instead, as the case
that breathes new life into its core.

134

Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1323 (citing Klein for proposition that statutes that prescribe
a rule of decision in pending cases are unconstitutional).
135
Id. (“More recent decisions, however, have made it clear that Klein does not inhibit Congress from amend[ing] applicable law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
136
Id. at 1335 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
137
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976).
138
Wasserman, supra note 72, at 55 (“[Klein] contains broad language and exaggerated rhetorical flourishes, with statements of principles that cannot literally be true and often are
dead wrong.”).
139
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 901 (2018).
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II. PATCHAK: A LAST GASP OR NEW LIFE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
Patchak arose from a decision of the Department of the Interior to take into
trust a tract of land known as the Bradley Property.140 Interior made this decision at the request of the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians, who desired land for building a casino.141 Patchak, who lived near the
Bradley Property, challenged the legality of Interior’s action under the Administrative Procedure Act.142 While Patchak’s lawsuit was pending, Congress
passed The Gun Lake Act,143 which identified and declared lawful the specific
decision to take the Bradley Property into trust.144 Making clear Congress’s intention to pick the winner in Patchak’s suit against Interior, the Gun Lake Act
also required the federal courts to “promptly dismiss” claims relating to the
Bradley Property.145 Specifically, it provides:
NO CLAIMS.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an action (including an action pending in a Federal court as of the date of enactment of this
Act) relating to the [Bradley Property] shall not be filed or maintained in a Federal court and shall be promptly dismissed.146

Pursuant to this statute, the district court dismissed Patchak’s suit against Interior and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.147
Before the Supreme Court, Patchak argued that the Gun Lake Act violated
the Klein rule of decision principle by directing federal courts to dismiss a
pending case without applying new law.148 But, following the broad definition
of changing the law set out in Bank Markazi, Congress did make new law: the
new law requires the court to dismiss cases relating to the Bradley Property.149
After Bank Markazi, therefore, Patchak should have been an easy case. Nevertheless, no opinion garnered a majority of the Court, and the multiple concurrences and dissent highlight the fact that the Klein rule of decision principle,
seemingly laid to rest in Bank Markazi, is still unsettled. In this Part, I describe
the Patchak opinions and highlight the issues they raise. In Part III, I offer sug-

140

Id. at 902–03. For a good explanation of Patchak’s potential effect on Klein’s rule of decision principle, see Monaghan, supra note 52, at 19–20 (noting that Thomas’s plurality
opinion seems to have articulated new and broad justifications for jurisdiction stripping provisions, despite Klein).
141
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903.
142
Id. (describing procedural posture).
143
Id. at 904 (citing Gun Lake Act, Pub. L. 113-179, 128 Stat. 1913 (2014) (requiring dismissal of Patchak’s claim against Interior)).
144
Id. (affirming Interior’s decision to take the Bradley Property into trust).
145
Id.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 908–09 (describing and rejecting argument based on Klein’s rule of decision principle).
149
Id. at 908 (citing Bank Markazi for broad reading of Changed Law Rule).
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gestions about how Patchak’s unsettled issues might be, and should be, resolved.
A. The Plurality
Justice Thomas wrote an opinion for a plurality of four, including Justices
Breyer, Alito, and Kagan. After framing Patchak as an issue of separation of
powers, Justice Thomas offered several independent reasons why the Gun Lake
Act did not violate the Klein rule of decision principle.150
First, adopting Bank Markazi’s broad definition of changing the law, Justice Thomas opined that Klein’s restrictions apply only when Congress directs
the courts to reach a result under old law, but not when Congress “changes the
law.”151 A jurisdiction-stripping statute like the Gun Lake Act, Thomas wrote,
changes the law because it eliminates jurisdiction for cases relating to the Bradley Property.152 Whatever Klein’s restrictions may be, therefore, they do not
prevent Congress from withdrawing jurisdiction over cases relating to the Bradley Property.153
Second, Thomas distinguished Klein on the ground that the appropriations
proviso disapproved in Klein was a “selective” jurisdiction-stripping statute.154
By contrast, he opined, the Gun Lake Act stripped jurisdiction over “every suit
relating to the Bradley Property,” which he characterized as a “class of cases.”155 Because a statute that strips jurisdiction over a class of cases is a lawful
exercise of Congress’s power to arrange the jurisdiction of the federal courts,
the Gun Lake Act, too, is lawful.156
Third, Thomas addressed the fact that the Gun Lake Act seemed specially
designed to reach a single pending case. Thomas expressed doubt that the constitutional line separating the legislative from the judicial branches can be
based either on Congress’s motives or the number of cases affected by the
change in law.157 Moreover, Thomas asserted, as a factual matter, the statute
did not address a single case.158 Because it required dismissal of cases “relating

150

Id. at 905.
Id. (interpreting the Changed Law Rule).
152
Id.
153
Id. (“Section 2(b) changes the law. Specifically, it strips federal courts of jurisdiction
over actions ‘relating to’ the Bradley Property.”).
154
Id. at 909 (“And unlike the selective jurisdiction-stripping statute in Klein, § 2(b) strips
jurisdiction over every suit relating to the Bradley Property.”).
155
Id. (emphasis added).
156
Id. (concluding that the Gun Lake Act strips jurisdiction in a class of cases).
157
Id. at 910 (“We doubt that the constitutional line separating the legislative and judicial
powers turns on factors such as a court’s doubts about Congress’s unexpressed motives, [or]
the number of ‘cases [that] were pending when the provision was enacted’ . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)).
158
Id.
151
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to” the Bradley Property, it applied, at least in theory, to an open-ended class of
cases.159
B. Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s Concurrences
In a concurring opinion for herself and Justice Sotomayor, Justice Ginsburg steered clear of the separation of powers implications of Patchak, opining
instead that it could be resolved as an issue of sovereign immunity.160 Because
it withdrew jurisdiction from the federal courts to hear a suit against the United
States, Ginsburg opined, the Gun Lake Act had the functional effect of asserting the government’s sovereign immunity.161 And because the United States
can always assert its immunity from suit, she concluded that the Gun Lake Act
was valid even though it directed a federal court to dismiss a particular, pending suit.162
Justice Sotomayor wrote a limited separate concurrence, emphasizing that,
had the suit been one between private parties, she would have joined the dissent, as she did in Bank Markazi.163 She concurred only because the United
States was a party. In her view, the Gun Lake Act “restored” the sovereign immunity of the United States, noting, like Ginsburg, that the assertion of sovereign immunity moots any separation of powers concerns.164
C. Breyer’s Concurrence
Justice Breyer wrote a separate concurrence in which he opined that Congress often “confirms” administrative action. Because Interior’s action to take

159

Id. Thomas raised two other points. First, he opined that Klein didn’t actually prohibit
Congress from directing the federal courts to reach a particular decision in pending cases. Id.
at 909. Rather, Thomas interpreted Klein to mean only that Congress could not declare that
pardons are not evidence of loyalty or strip the court of jurisdiction to reach the same result.
Id. Contrary to this view, Klein rested on two separate grounds for its result: one, that by
providing a rule of decision for the courts to follow, “Congress has inadvertently passed the
limit which separates the legislative from the judicial power;” and two, and in the alternative,
that by “impairing the effect of a pardon,” the proviso infringed on “the constitutional power
of the Executive.” United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1871). Second,
Thomas also addressed the argument that Congress impermissibly interfered with the
Court’s previous decision in Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians v.
Patchak, 567 U.S. 209 (2012) (Patchak I), which held that Patchak’s case “may proceed.”
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 903–04. He opined that Patchak’s suit was not final, so Plaut’s rule
against reopening final judgments did not apply. See id. at 908.
160
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912–13 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
161
Id. at 913.
162
Id. at 912–13 (“Just as it is Congress’ prerogative to consent to suit, so too is it within
Congress’ authority to withdraw consent once given.”).
163
Id. at 913 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see also Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct.
1310, 1329–30 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
164
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 914 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
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the Bradley Property into trust was itself constitutional, Congress’s action confirming or ratifying this administration action was likewise constitutional.165
D. Roberts’s Dissent
Chief Justice Roberts authored a dissent joined by Justices Kennedy and
Gorsuch. He would have held that Congress violates the principle of separation
of powers when it “manipulates jurisdictional rules to decide the outcome of a
particular pending case.”166 In a reprise of his dissenting opinion in Bank
Markazi, Roberts recounted the history of the Confederation period. He emphasized the social and economic dislocations caused by early state legislatures’
usurpation of judicial functions.167 But, in Patchak, the Chief Justice drew a
different conclusion than he did in his Bank Markazi dissent, and it was a conclusion with potentially far-reaching consequences: the Constitution prohibits
the legislature from applying the law in a particular case.168 Drawing on the
general principle that the legislature sets rules for society while the judiciary
and executive apply those rules in individual cases, Roberts suggested that Article III limits the legislature’s power to decide individual cases.169 Roberts
connected this principle with Klein, opining that Klein stands for the proposition that the legislature may not intervene in a particular pending case in a way
that cuts out the role of the judiciary.170
Roberts went on to respond to the plurality and concurring opinions. First,
Roberts rejected Thomas’s argument that the Gun Lake Act withdrew jurisdiction over a class of cases. Rather, he opined, the Gun Lake Act was intended to
withdraw jurisdiction over a particular case, despite being framed in a general
way.171 The specificity, opined Roberts, distinguishes the Gun Lake Act from
the statute upheld in Bank Markazi, which resolved consolidated cases from
more than one thousand claimants.172
Second, Roberts countered Thomas’s argument that all Congress must do
to “amend applicable law” within the meaning of Klein is enact a statute. Contrary to Thomas’s assertion that the Changed Law Rule is a wholesale exception to Klein, Roberts would have held that “the concept of ‘changing the law’

165

Id. at 911–12 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 919–20 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
167
Id. at 914–15 (noting “disarray produced by this system of legislative equity” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
168
Id. at 915, 919–20 (“Congress exercises the judicial power when it manipulates jurisdictional rules to decide the outcome of a particular pending case.”).
169
Id. at 915.
170
Id. at 915–916.
171
Id. at 917.
172
Id. at 918.
166
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must imply some measure of generality or preservation of an adjudicative role
for the courts.”173
Third, the Chief Justice rejected Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s conclusion that the Gun Lake Act restored the government’s sovereign immunity.174 Roberts did not respond directly to the constitutional argument—whether
Congress may assert sovereign immunity in particular pending case—but rather
rested on statutory interpretation grounds. Specifically, Roberts opined that the
Gun Lake Act, in fact, failed to restore the sovereign immunity of the United
States because it did not use the words like “immunity” or “consent.”175
Fourth, Roberts responded to Justice Breyer’s opinion that Congress was
merely confirming, without augmenting, the law. If Congress did not alter the
law, responded Roberts, then it could not have “changed the law” within the
meaning of the Changed Law Rule.176 More fundamentally, Roberts objected
that congressional action is not necessarily constitutional merely because it ratifies or simplifies administrative action. Instead, the touchstone of constitutionality is whether Congress is exercising judicial power.177 Because the Gun Lake
Act applied the law to a particular case, Roberts opined that it is unconstitutional irrespective of whether it also confirmed administrative action.178
I explain this fractured set of opinions at length to demonstrate how some
fundamental issues about judicial independence are still unresolved. Indeed,
Patchak’s various opinions touch on many of the same themes as Hart’s Dialogue, confirming both the fundamental nature of the issues Patchak raises and
The Dialogue’s contemporary relevance.179 The disagreements in Patchak, although couched in fine doctrinal terms, are in reality disagreements about nothing less important than the line between the judicial and legislative powers. In
Part III, I explain how the fundamental issues raised in Patchak can be resolved
in a way that protects the core of judicial independence while still providing
ample room for Congress to legislate.
III. A CHANCE FOR JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE
Patchak’s fractured opinions broach an array of issues relating to the Klein
rule of decision principle and judicial independence more generally. But, because a majority of the Court agreed on Patchak’s result without agreeing on a
rationale, Patchak offers little guidance on what the Court might do in a slightly different future case and even less guidance to lower courts on how to ap173

Id. at 920.
Id. at 921–22.
175
Id. at 922.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id.
179
Monaghan, supra note 52, at 4 (noting the contemporary relevance of Hart’s The Dialogue).
174
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proach these important issues.180 In this Part, I address the issues joined, but not
settled, in Patchak, including: the scope of the Changed Law Rule; the constitutionality of targeted legislation; what it means for Congress to withdraw jurisdiction over a “class of cases;” and the relationship between sovereign immunity and the rule of decision principle. After exploring the dispute over each of
these issues, I suggest how the courts, including the Supreme Court, should approach them in a future case. Although there are no easy answers to the questions raised in Patchak, following the suggestions set out below will allow
courts to preserve the core judicial role without encroaching on Congress’s legislative function.
A. The Changed Law Rule
Patchak’s plurality and dissent squarely join issue on the breadth of the
Changed Law Rule. In Thomas’s view, any statute changes the law sufficient to
defeat an application of Klein, even a statute that makes an exception to the
generally applicable law for a single piece of property.181 As Thomas crisply
reasoned, by withdrawing jurisdiction over claims relating the Bradley Property, the Gun Lake Act “changes the law . . . . Before the Gun Lake Act, federal
courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. Now they do not.”182 Roberts, by
contrast, reads a limitation into the Changed Law Rule, suggesting that not every statute “changes the law” in a way that defeats Klein.183 In a sense, this dispute is the most important one in Patchak. If Thomas is correct, then no statute
ever can be invalid under the Klein rule of decision principle because the
Changed Law Rule is coextensive with it.184
1. The Overbreadth of Thomas’s Approach
Thomas’s rendering of the Changed Law Rule is too broad to comport either with Klein or with Thomas’s own stated justification for the Changed Law
Rule. First, Thomas’s Changed Law Rule is at odds with Klein itself. The ap180

Lower courts disagree about how to apply the rule in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977), which provides that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on
the narrowest grounds . . . .’ ” Under one approach to this test, a position is the narrowest
ground when its reasoning implicitly has been approved by a majority who support the result. See King v. Palmer, 950 F.2d 771, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (en banc). Under a second approach, a position is the narrowest ground for the result when it would change the law the
least, or be most specific to the case being decided. See Bormuth v. Cnty. of Jackson, 849
F.3d 266, 279 (6th Cir. 2017).
181
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905.
182
Id. (internal citation omitted).
183
Id. at 920 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he concept of ‘changing the law’ must imply
some measure of generality or preservation of an adjudicative role for the courts.”).
184
See supra Section I.B.
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propriations proviso held unconstitutional in Klein changed the law within
Thomas’s definition of that concept. Recall that Klein’s appropriations proviso
required the court to dismiss claims that were predicated on evidence that the
claimant took an oath of loyalty.185 Under Thomas’s definition of the Changed
Law Rule, the appropriations proviso changed the law: before the proviso, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear actions predicated on evidence of a loyalty
oath. After the appropriations proviso, they did not.186 On Thomas’s own reading, therefore, there is no space for a Klein principle to operate consistent with
the Changed Law Rule.
Second, the vitality of Klein aside, Thomas’s reading of the Changed Law
Rule is too broad because it conflicts with his own description of what the principle of separation of powers requires. Thomas opined in Patchak that the principle of separation of powers prevents Congress from “usurp[ing] a court’s
power to interpret and apply the law to the [circumstances] before it.”187 But,
the Changed Law Rule as Thomas envisions it validates statutes that do just
that. In Robertson, the Court (in an opinion by Thomas himself) upheld the
Northwest Timber Compromise, which directed the federal courts to interpret a
statute in a particular way for three pending cases.188 The Court held that this
statute changed the law.189 If a statute that directs courts to interpret a statute in
a particular way for a pending case changes the law in a way that defeats the
application of Klein, then there would seem to be no statute that could encroach
on the judicial power.190 The breadth of Thomas’s approach to the Changed
Law Rule warrants a search for a different approach to this principle.
2. Three Narrower Approaches
Justice Thomas’s Changed Law Rule is inconsistent both with Klein and
with even an extremely modest view of judicial independence. A narrower definition of what it means to change the law, by contrast, not only makes it possible to reconcile the Changed Law Rule and the Klein rule of decision principle
but it also preserves the core of judicial independence.

185

United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143 (1871) (describing operation of proviso).
186
Cf. Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 905, 909 (“Before the Gun Lake Act, federal courts had jurisdiction to hear these actions. Now they do not.” (internal citation omitted)).
187
Id. at 905 (alterations in original) (internal citation omitted).
188
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 429–30 (1992) (describing effect of
Compromise).
189
Id. at 438 (“We conclude that subsection (b)(6)(A) compelled changes in law . . . .”).
190
Thomas’s opinion in Patchak itself confirms this point. See Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 908.
Patchak reaffirmed Bank Markazi, which interpreted the law for one particular set of cases.
Id. If the Bank Markazi statute changed the law within the meaning of the Changed Law
Rule, then there is no constitutional line between law-making and law-application.
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First, the Changed Law Rule and the Klein rule of decision principle can
coexist if changing the law in a way that defeats the application of Klein means
setting policy. As I have argued elsewhere,191 although most statutes, no matter
how modest, indisputably set policy, a statute that does little or nothing other
than to decide pending cases does not set policy and should not be considered
to change the law in a way that defeats the application of Klein.
Reading the Changed Law Rule to distinguish between setting policy and
deciding pending cases fits neatly with constitutional law doctrine outside of
the Klein context. In United States v. Winstar,192 the government encouraged
healthy banks to take over insolvent savings and loans by promising the banks
favorable accounting treatment.193 These promises were made through “express
arrangements between the regulators and the acquiring institutions.”194 Soon
after banks merged with the insolvent institutions, Congress prohibited the
government from keeping its regulatory promises, rendering many of the
merged institutions instantly insolvent.195 Justice Souter, for a plurality, opined
that deference to Congress’s decision to invalidate the government’s promises
was not warranted because the statute shifted the costs of the government’s
breach of promise to particular parties.196 Souter noted that deference to Congress’s decision to alter its obligations is appropriate only if this decision is
“merely incidental to the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective.”197 By contrast, if the statute appears to be doing little other than shifting
the costs of governmental decisions to particular parties, the Court will not defer to the statute because it does not set policy.198 Importantly, Souter was keenly aware that the government’s cost-shifting maneuver was in the public interest.199 Nevertheless, a purpose to promote the general welfare did not insulate
the government from its decision to shift the costs of the government’s decision
to particular parties.200
The Winstar approach can be adapted easily to the Changed Law Rule.
Most statutes, even quite narrow ones, set policy because they achieve a governmental objective broader than merely shifting the costs of governmental de191

Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2206–07 (arguing that the Changed Law Rule should be
read to distinguish between statutes that set policy and statutes that do not set policy); Evan
C. Zoldan, Is the Federal Judiciary Independent of Congress?, 70 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE
135, 139–40 (2018) [hereinafter Zoldan, Federal Judiciary] (same).
192
United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 839 (1996) (plurality opinion).
193
Id. at 848–51 (describing goodwill program).
194
Id. at 853–54.
195
Id. at 845–48.
196
Id. at 900–03.
197
Id. at 897–98 (emphasis added).
198
Id.
199
Id. at 903.
200
Id. (noting that the public interest-serving aspect of the statute does not necessarily make
it a public and general law).
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cisions to particular private parties. For example, a statute prohibiting or penalizing a class of conduct (say, discharging pollutants)201 would set policy within
the meaning of Winstar. Although such a statute raises costs for potential polluters, it does not raise costs for particular, identifiable parties. Rather, the category of potential polluters is an indeterminate class because others might become polluters in the future and current polluters might cease polluting. As a
result, this kind of statute achieves a government objective (penalizing pollution) rather than merely shifting costs to particular, identifiable polluters. By
contrast, a statute that breaches a particular set of agreements (as in Winstar),
or a statute that directs the result only in a particular, pending case, merely
shifts costs to identifiable parties and therefore does not achieve a governmental objective other than to penalize identifiable members of a class.
Admittedly, and as Professor Araiza has noted, the Winstar approach requires some line-drawing to determine whether a very narrow statute sets policy or merely shifts costs.202 In rare cases, perhaps in a case like Patchak itself,
this will be a difficult task. Because Patchak’s lawsuit was prompted by a single lawsuit about a specific governmental decision and a particular piece of
land,203 the Gun Lake Act can be seen as a cost-shifting measure to relieve the
government of the responsibility of answering for its actions in court. Whether
the Gun Lake Act did anything other than merely shift costs turns on the interpretation of the Gun Lake Act. On one hand, as Roberts suggested,204 the purpose of the statute was to require the dismissal of Patchak’s claim.205 On this
interpretation, the Gun Lake Act merely shifted costs for a pending case and
did not set policy.206 On the other hand, in Thomas’s view, the plain language
of the Gun Lake Act applies to all cases, even possible future cases, relating to
the Bradley Property. 207 On this reading, the Gun Lake Act did set policy—the
201

E.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“[T]he discharge of any pollutant by any person shall be unlawful.”).
202
Araiza has argued that a Winstar-inspired approach to Klein is difficult or impossible to
apply as a theoretical matter. William Araiza, The Once and (Maybe) Future Klein Principle, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 383, 394–95 (2018). While Araiza is surely correct that
this test does not provide a bright-line rule to distinguish close cases, a bright-line rule may
not be realistic for a complex separation of powers issue like Klein’s rule of decision principle. The Winstar principle articulated here is coherent because there are cases that easily violate the principle and cases that easily survive the principle. There are cases on the line, but
courts make decisions all the time that call on them to distinguish close cases.
203
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 897 (2018).
204
Id. at 917 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (opining that the Gun Lake Act dictates “a particular
outcome” to “a particular party”).
205
Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(b), 128 Stat. 1913
(2014) (narrowly reaching a single pending case).
206
For more on the Winstar approach to Patchak, see Zoldan, Federal Judiciary, supra note
191 at 138–40.
207
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 910 (“Nothing on the face of § 2(b) is limited to Patchak’s case, or
even to his challenge under the Indian Reorganization Act. Instead, the text extends to all
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policy to end litigation over the Bradley Property. This interpretive dispute
demonstrates that difficult issues of statutory interpretation can give rise to
close cases, even under the formulation I suggest. However, because it is often
easy to determine whether a statute applies to a closed class of cases or an open
class, most cases will be resolved with little difficulty, making the policy / costshifting dichotomy a meaningful if not perfect distinction.
Second, and related to the policy / cost-shifting distinction drawn above,
the Changed Law Rule could be read to require a court to apply a statutory
change only if it changes the generally applicable law. Chief Justice Roberts
made this suggestion in his Patchak dissent.208 To Roberts, a statutory change
that applies to a single pending case is not a change of law that can defeat the
application of Klein. The Chief Justice’s suggestion hints at the possibility that
targeted legislation is constitutionally suspect simply because it is targeted.
There is merit to the Chief’s suggestion; indeed, a constitutional principle disfavoring targeted legislation is even more robust and more complex than he
suggests. The constitutional sources of a principle prohibiting targeted legislation, and questions about the scope of this principle, are discussed more fully in
Section III.B., below.
Third, the ostensible conflict between the rule of decision principle and the
Changed Law Rule turns out to be illusory if the original relationship between
these doctrines is restored. As noted above, the evisceration of the Klein rule of
decision principle was made possible by the inversion of the relationship between it and the Changed Law Rule.209 When Klein was decided, the Changed
Law Rule provided that a court, even on appeal, must apply the law in force at
the time it decides a case.210 Klein, which post-dated the Changed Law Rule,
can be considered an exception to it, preventing the application of the Changed
Law Rule when the new statute “prescribe[s] rules of decision to the Judicial
Department of the government in cases pending before it.”211 Although the
meaning of the this language is far from certain, it can easily be read more narrowly than the Changed Law Rule, allowing the two doctrines to coexist. For
example, the Klein rule of decision principle might be read to prevent the application of new law when it purports to apply to pending cases only. This version
of Klein can coexist with the Changed Law Rule because the two do not completely overlap; that is, this version of Klein will block some, but not all, appli-

suits ‘relating to’ the Bradley Property. Thus, § 2(b) survives even under the dissent’s theory: It ‘prospectively govern[s] an open-ended class of disputes’ . . . .”).
208
Id. at 920 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (opining that changing the law implies changing
some generally applicable law).
209
See supra Section I.B.
210
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (“[When] subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and
positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed . . . .”).
211
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 146 (1871).
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cations of the Changed Law Rule.212 There are other ways to narrow the rule of
decision principle to make it compatible with the Changed Law Rule.213 But, at
least, as this approach shows, the two need not conflict. As a result, it is possible to give meaning to the rule of decision principle and the Changed Law Rule
by reading both to preserve an adjudicatory role for the courts.
B. The Constitutionality of Targeted Legislation
Klein’s rule of decision principle has long been considered mysterious because its result seems both intuitively correct and inconsistent with basic principles of law.214 Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent offers a possible solution to this
dilemma by suggesting that Klein can be justified as an implementation of a
constitutional value that prohibits legislation targeted to reach a single case.215
Roberts’s suggestion is promising but requires some further elaboration.
1. A Constitutional Value of Legislative Generality
As Roberts correctly notes, a principle that disfavors legislation targeting
an identifiable individual (often called special legislation)216 comports with
other areas of constitutional law. A value disfavoring special legislation makes
sense in light of Fletcher v. Peck’s distinction between the legislature’s lawmaking authority and the judiciary’s law-application function.217 After all, if
applying the law is reserved to the executive and judicial branches, then it
makes sense that the legislature would be prohibited from writing a statute so
specific that it can only apply to a specific individual; such a targeted statute
would appear to infringe on the law-application function of the other branches.
But, a value disfavoring targeted legislation is more nuanced, more robust, and
even more deeply ingrained in the American constitutional fabric than Roberts
suggests. As I have argued in previous work, a principle disfavoring targeted
legislation—which may be called a value of legislative generality—is support-

212

I will defend this reading of the Changed Law Rule below. Infra Section III.C. Importantly, Roberts’s reading of the Changed Law Rule and the rule of decision principle is
different than his claim that the rule of decision principle prevents Congress from intervening in a single pending case. This latter claim rests on the particularity of the statute, an issue
discussed more fully below.
213
For example, some scholars have suggested that it applies only to constitutional claims.
E.g., Monaghan, supra note 52, at 67 (contrasting statutory claims and constitutional claims
in the context of Klein).
214
Zoldan, Klein, supra note 20, at 2149 (Klein’s rule of decision principle seems at once
“intuitively correct and too broad to be literally true”).
215
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 915–16 (2018) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
216
Evan C. Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 625, 632 (2014)
[hereinafter Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality] (defining special legislation).
217
See Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 136 (1810) (distinguishing between lawmaking and law-application).
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ed by the Constitution’s history and text, and also by persuasive normative considerations.218
First, during the Confederation period, newly independent state legislatures
enacted countless targeted statutes that imposed punishment on named individuals, transferred title to land, granted individuals exemptions from the standing
laws, and confiscated property from named individuals.219 By the mid-1780s,
after a long decade of suffering from the repercussions of targeted legislation,
the framing generation wholeheartedly repudiated their legislatures’ power to
enact targeted laws.220 In their writings, speeches, and debates, members of the
framing generation denounced their legislatures for “extending their deliberations to the cases of individuals” and granting them unearned privileges and
imposing unearned burdens on them.221 The experience of these legislative
abuses served as a key impetus for a new national constitution.222
Second, and based on these experiences, the constitutional text drafted by
the framers reflects a value of legislative generality. In addition to the Bill of
Attainder Clauses (which most directly prohibit targeted legislative punishment), the Ex Post Facto, Contract, Equal Protection, Due Process, Takings,
and General Welfare clauses also support a value of legislative generality because each can fairly be read to prohibit a certain type of particularized legislation.223 For example, although the Equal Protection Clause is primarily concerned with government classifications of individuals,224 the Supreme Court has
also emphasized that the clause prohibits legislative specification by limiting
the government’s power to single out an individual as a “class of one.”225 Simi218

Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 650–60 (describing a constitutional principle of legislative generality); Evan C. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component of Legislative Generality, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 489, 489 (2017) [hereinafter Zoldan, The
Equal Protection Component] (distinguishing generality from equal protection); Zoldan,
Klein, supra note 20, at 2152–53 (comparing generality with the Klein rule of decision principle).
219
Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 662–65 (recounting the special legislation-related abuses of the Confederation period).
220
Id. at 669–79 (describing the rejection of special legislation during the framing period).
221
COUNCIL OF CENSORS, A REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE, in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA 35, 38 (1784) (describing Confederation-era legislative
abuses).
222
Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 652. (“By the close of the
confederation period, both special privileges and special detriments were considered ‘repugnant to the spirit of the American republics.’ It was with these experiences, and in large part
driven by them, that the framers of the Constitution arrived in Philadelphia in 1787.” (internal citations omitted)).
223
Id. at 653 (describing textual support for a value of legislative generality).
224
See Engquist v. Or. Dep’t of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 601 (2008) (limiting the class-of-one
doctrine).
225
Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (describing the class-of-one
doctrine). For an explanation of the class of one doctrine, see Zoldan, The Equal Protection
Component, supra note 218, at 525–31.
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larly, although the Due Process Clause has been applied to a wide array of government actions, one of its oldest applications prohibits the legislature from
“taking the property of A and giving it to B.”226 In this same way, each of the
clauses identified above contains a component that reinforces legislative generality, either because of the effect given to it by the Court or the historical experiences that gave rise to its inclusion in the Constitution. Reading these clauses
together suggests that a value of legislative generality pervades the Constitution
and should inform its interpretation.227
Third, jurists, philosophers of law, and other commentators have long argued either that targeted legislation is outside the legislative power altogether
or that it is bad law. Locke wrote that the legislature may not “rule by extemporary arbitrary decrees”228 and its laws may not be varied “in particular cases.”229
The United States Supreme Court invoked this tradition in Hurtado v. California when it noted that “not every act, legislative in form” can be considered
“law.”230 Specifically, “a special rule for a particular person or a particular
case,” including “acts of confiscation, acts reversing judgments, and acts directly transferring one man’s estate to another,” are simply excluded from its definition.231 As a normative matter, special legislation is often associated with corruption, animus, favoritism, and unjustified inequalities,232 leading
commentators to conclude that it is “unjust,”233 “unfair,”234 and iniquitous.235
2. Applying a Value of Legislative Generality
A Klein principle that prohibits Congress from directing the result in pending cases is consistent with the constitutional value of legislative generality described above. Indeed, such a principle resonates strongly with the historical
underpinnings of the Constitution: Confederation-era legislative interference
226

JOHN V. ORTH, DUE PROCESS OF LAW: A BRIEF HISTORY 52–53 (2003); see also Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (noting that impropriety of “a law that takes property
from A. and gives it to B”).
227
Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 653 (describing the Constitution’s generality clauses).
228
JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 136 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1980)
(1690).
229
Id. § 142.
230
Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535 (1884).
231
Id. at 535–36.
232
Evan C. Zoldan, Legislative Design and the Controllable Costs of Special Legislation, 78
MD. L. REV. 415, 415 (2019) [hereinafter Zoldan, Legislative Design] (describing costs of
special legislation).
233
MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE COMMONWEALTH AND ON THE LAWS 173 (James E. G.
Zerzel ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1999).
234
LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 47 (12th prtg. 1980).
235
JAMES H. DOUGLAS, RECORDS OF THE COUNCIL OF CENSORS OF THE STATE OF VERMONT
67–68 (Paul S Gillies & D. Gregory Sanford eds. 1991).
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with court judgments was a key factor precipitating the Philadelphia Convention.236 A Klein principle prohibiting Congress from directing the result in a
pending case is also consistent with, if not directly compelled by, the Constitution’s prohibition on certain types of special laws. And a Klein principle also
resonates with the normative justifications for a value of legislative generality
because legislation that targets a pending case is apt to be based on animus or
favoritism.237
There are difficult questions, to be sure, that must be answered before the
Court could apply a value of legislative generality in the context of Klein.
Many of these questions are raised, either explicitly or implicitly, in the exchange between Justice Thomas and the Chief Justice in Patchak. As Justice
Thomas noted, at least as a formal matter, the Gun Lake Act did not apply to a
single case alone.238 It was written in general language, applying to “an action
pending in a Federal court” rather than to Patchak’s case specifically.239 Moreover, the Gun Lake Act required the dismissal of any claim relating to the
Bradley Property.240 As a result, on its face it applies to future actions relating
to the Bradley Property, even if these future actions are unrelated to the suit already dismissed.241 The Chief Justice responded to these arguments by noting
that the “practical operation” of the statute “unequivocally confirms that it concerns solely Patchak’s suit.”242
As this exchange suggests, there are a number of difficult issues that will
arise if a court seeks to apply a value of legislative generality in the Klein context. These include the following: whether a targeted statute is impermissible
even if it does not name the individual case targeted; whether it is impermissible to target, not only an individual case, but also a small group of cases; and
whether a statute is impermissibly targeted if some, but not all, of the targeted
cases are determined at the time it is enacted.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court would not be writing on a blank slate when
answering these and many other questions about the precise contours of a value
of legislative generality. In previous work, I have set out the core commitments
236

Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1330 (2016) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the early state legislative abuses included interference “in cases still pending before
courts, [and] granting continuances, stays of judgments,” and new trials).
237
The statute upheld in Bank Markazi, for example, transferred property from an unsympathetic party (the Central Bank of Iran) to sympathetic parties (victims of state-sponsored terrorism). Iran Threat Reduction and Syria Human Rights Act of 2012, 22 U.S.C. § 8772.
238
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 910 (2018) (noting the general applicability of the Act).
239
Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, Pub. L. No. 113-179, § 2(b), 128 Stat. 1913
(2014).
240
Id.
241
Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 910. Whether Thomas is correct, or whether the Chief Justice is
correct that all other claims related to the Bradley Property are barred by statutes of limitations, is a matter of statutory interpretation.
242
Id. at 918 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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of a value of legislative generality and general principles to guide courts in peripheral cases. Succinctly stated, the value of “legislative generality disfavors
legislation that singles out a person or small, identifiable group for special
treatment to which the general population is not subject.”243 Its core commitments, most relevant here, include prohibiting the legislature from: “interfering
with both civil and criminal judicial processes for named claimants or defendants; declaring the proper interpretation of a standing law in a particular
case; . . . and transferring property from one person to another.”244
Outside of these core commitments, my previous work suggests that the
value of legislative generality should be less restrictive when it comes to “special laws that prefigure generally applicable laws” or “that eliminate, rather
than create, disparities between people.”245
In addition to this theoretical work, state courts have extensive practical
experience resolving these very issues under state constitutional prohibitions on
special legislation.246 To give a sense of the answers they have reached, state
courts tend to hold that a statute can be prohibited as special legislation even if
it does not name the individual it targets.247 Similarly, state courts sometimes
invalidate a statute as impermissibly special even if it applies to a small, known
group rather than a single individual.248 Finally, state courts tend to evaluate a
facially general statute based on whether it applies to an “open class” or a
“closed class.”249 A class is closed if it is impossible, or extremely unlikely, that
another person or entity will fall within the statutory classification in the future.
243

Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 688.
Id. at 688–89.
245
Id. at 689.
246
DANIEL R. MANDELKER, JUDITH WELCH WEGNER, JANICE C. GRIFFITH, EVAN C. ZOLDAN
& CYNTHIA BAKER, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM 670 (9th ed.
2020) (noting that courts often invalidate statutes as special even though they do “not name a
particular entity”); id. at 671 (“Courts often invalidate . . . narrowly drawn statutes as special
laws.”); id. at 669 (“[C]ourts often hold that a challenged law is special when it creates a
‘closed class.’ ”).
247
Cities Serv. Co. v. Governor of Maryland, 431 A.2d 663, 673 (Md. 1981) (“[S]tatutory
provisions which did not name particular individuals or entities have been held to be prohibited special laws, whereas enactments naming specific entities have been held not to be special laws.” (citations omitted)); City of Topeka v. Gillett, 4 P. 800, 804 (Kan. 1884) (“[A]n
act . . . may be special where it simply describes the particular persons or things so that they
may be known, as well as where it gives their particular names or distinctive appellations.”).
248
People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 385 (Colo. 2005) (statute creating class of two coconspirators violated prohibition on special legislation); Opyt’s Amoco, Inc. v. Vill. of S.
Holland, 568 N.E.2d 260, 269 (Ill. 1991) (“Special legislation confers a special benefit or
exclusive privilege on a person or a group of persons to the exclusion of others similarly situated.”).
249
Canister, 110 P.3d at 384 (“By contrast, a class that is drawn so that it will never have
any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the legislation creating such a class is unconstitutional special legislation.”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t. of Transp.,
202 P.3d 1226, 1276 (Haw. 2009) (invalidating a statute as a special law when, although
framed as a general law, in reality it applied only to a closed class of one).
244
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Courts tend to find that a generally written statute that creates a closed class is
prohibited as special legislation.250 By contrast, courts tend to uphold classifications when a statute creates an “open” class, that is, a class into which other
people or entities could fall in the future.251
The Supreme Court is not, of course, required to follow the path that state
courts have taken. But, the Court may find the states’ doctrinal solutions useful
because, for many questions about special legislation, the states have articulated relatively manageable standards. At the very least, reviewing the states’ approaches will give the Court a sense of the types of issues that it will need to
resolve in order to apply Klein’s rule of decision principle in light of a value of
legislative generality.
C. A “Class of Cases”
Closely related to the issue of legislative generality is the issue of what
constitutes a “class of cases.” As Justice Thomas noted in Patchak, the Klein
Court specifically reaffirmed that Congress has the power to withdraw jurisdiction over a “class of cases.”252 Because the Gun Lake Act applied to cases relating to the Bradley Property, Thomas opined that it withdrew jurisdiction over a
class of cases within the meaning of Klein.253 Chief Justice Roberts did not deny this reading of Klein, instead arguing that, as a practical matter, the Gun
Lake Act withdrew jurisdiction over just one case, Patchak’s suit against the
United States.254 He concluded that the Gun Lake Act did not, therefore, withdraw jurisdiction over a “class of cases.”255 Although Roberts implies that a
single case is not a class of cases, and Thomas implies that any number of cases
greater than one is a class, both Roberts and Thomas carefully avoided defining
what constitutes a class. As described below, a more nuanced approach than the
ones suggested by Thomas or Roberts better explains what Klein’s “class of
cases” should mean.
1. A Class of Cases v. a Single Case
The simplest way to define a class of cases is to follow the line of reasoning suggested by Justice Thomas. Noting that the Gun Lake Act required the
dismissal of more than one case, Thomas neatly concluded that it withdrew ju250

MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 246, at 669–70 (“[C]ourts often hold that a challenged
law is special when it creates a ‘closed class.’ A class is closed rather than open if it is impossible, or extremely unlikely, that another person or entity will fall within the statutory
classification in the future.”).
251
Id. at 670 (“Conversely, courts tend to uphold classifications that are narrowly drawn if
the class is ‘open,’ that is, if other people or entities may fall into the class in the future.”).
252
Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906–07 (2018).
253
Id. at 909.
254
Id. at 916–17 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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risdiction over a “class of cases.”256 Although he did not say so explicitly,
Thomas’s conclusion can be taken as implicitly assuming that any number of
cases greater than one is a class within the meaning of Klein.
The major advantage of this suggested rule is that it is relatively easy to
administer: whether a statute applies to a single case or to more than one case
normally can be discerned from the text of a statute and its legislative context.
Consider the statute that created a special exemption allowing the appointment
of James Mattis as Secretary of Defense.257 As the language of the statute made
clear, it was a “limited exception,” applying “only to the first person appointed
as Secretary of Defense” and to “no other person.”258 To erase all doubt about
the bill’s reach, its proponents introduced the bill as “a one-time exemption on
behalf of an individual” that would not “permanently change the law.”259 Just
as the text and legislative context made clear that the Mattis waiver statute applied to one person, similarly, it will be easy to determine, for many statutes,
whether they apply to a single case or more than one case.
However, even clear statutory language can give rise to grey areas. The
legislation upheld in Bank Markazi, for example, deemed the assets of Bank
Markazi to be the assets of Iran, but only for one particular, consolidated action
involving nineteen judgments and more than a thousand victims.260 On one
hand, the statute affected only a single pending case. But, on the other hand,
because the single case was a consolidated action of nineteen judgments, it can
also be viewed as more than one case. As this ambiguity reveals, a rule that distinguishes between a single case and more than one case does not neatly resolve all situations.
Another advantage of Thomas’s bright-line rule is that it is consistent with
the constitutional value of legislative generality. As noted, a value of legislative
generality prevents the legislature from targeting an individual for special
treatment, which is often associated with corruption, animus, favoritism, or
other costs.261 A rule that prevents the application of a change in law to a single
case advances the value of legislative generality by preventing the legislature
from targeting an individual case and imposing these kinds of costs. A rule that
distinguishes between a single case and any number of cases greater than one,
however, is not a perfect fit with a value of legislative generality. Legislation
that targets a group of identifiable individuals creates many of the same costs as
256

Id. at 910 (plurality opinion).
Act of Jan. 20, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-2, 131 Stat. 6 (creating a special exception for
James Mattis).
258
Id.
259
163 CONG. REC. H9,480 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 2017) (statement of Rep. Dan Newhouse).
260
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1326–27 (2016). This ambiguity was raised
in the Bank Markazi Supreme Court oral argument. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Bank
Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310 (2016) (No. 14-770).
261
Zoldan, Legislative Design, supra note 232, at 418–19, 426–42 (enumerating the costs
associated with special legislation).
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legislation that targets a single individual.262 Because the legislature knows who
will benefit or suffer from the targeted legislation,263 legislation targeting both
an individual and a group of known individuals can be prompted by corruption,
animus, favoritism, or other illegitimate motives. As a result, a rule that distinguishes between a single case and any number of cases greater than one will
not prevent legislation creating many of the harms that a more nuanced value of
legislative generality could address.
Weighed against these imperfect advantages, there are also significant
drawbacks to a rule that turns on a precise number of cases. Defining a class of
cases for the purposes of Klein in this way will often lead to an arbitrary distinction between statutes that are similar in a relevant way.
For example, consider again Robertson’s Northwest Timber Compromise,
which instructed the federal courts to interpret the environmental and land
management statutes underlying three named lawsuits in favor of the suits’ defendants.264 By requiring the court to interpret statutory terms in a particular
way, Congress arguably encroached on the independence of the courts, usurping the judicial function. But, whatever the severity of the encroachment on the
courts, it had little to do with the precise number of cases that were affected.
Had the statute directed the court to interpret the generally applicable law for
one particular lawsuit rather than three, the incursion into the judicial role
would have been fundamentally the same. A Klein principle that prevents Congress from directing the result in a single case, but is powerless if Congress directs the result in two or three related suits, would be easily evaded and lead to
arbitrary distinctions between similar situations.265
Finally, a Klein rule that distinguishes between a single case and any number of cases greater than one is contrary to the holding in Klein itself. The appropriations proviso invalidated in Klein did not merely require dismissal of
Klein’s case.266 Rather, it required the dismissal of a group of cases that fit a
particular description: that is, cases in which a plaintiff had prevailed in the
Court of Claims, relying on evidence of an oath of loyalty, against the United
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People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 381 (Colo. 2005) (invalidating as special statute applying to two people).
263
Zoldan, Reviving Legislative Generality, supra note 216, at 654 (noting that one cost of
special legislation is legislative targeting).
264
Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Soc’y, 503 U.S. 429, 437–38 (1992) (describing impact of
Compromise on pending cases).
265
Conversely, there may be situations where a statute applies to one individual but appears
justified in some way. In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 472, 477
(1977), the Court upheld a law confiscating the papers of former President Nixon because he
was a “legitimate class of one.”
266
Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235; see also Tyler, supra note 109, at 94–95
(noting that the appropriations proviso was intended to apply to multiple cases brought by
former rebels).
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States.267 As a result, when the Klein Court distinguished the group of cases affected by the appropriations proviso from a “class of cases,” it must have used
“class of cases” to mean something other than any number of cases greater than
one. Contrary to Thomas’s argument, therefore, Patchak cannot be distinguished from Klein on the basis of the number of suits affected. If Klein is still
good law, as Thomas suggested, then a “class of cases” must mean something
other than any number of cases greater than one.
2. A Class of Cases v. Pending Cases Only
Klein itself suggests an approach to defining a “class of cases” that is superior to the distinction between a single case and any number of cases greater
than one. When the Klein Court approved Congress’s authority to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts in “a particular class of cases,”268 it contrasted
this power with the appropriations proviso, which unconstitutionally prescribed
a rule of decision to a court “in cases pending before it.”269 This statement can
be read as expressing a concern not with the application of new law to pending
cases (which is generally permitted under the Changed Law Rule),270 but rather
as a concern with the application of new law to pending cases only. Under this
reading of a “class of cases,” the problem with the appropriations proviso was
that there were no cases other than pending cases to which it could have applied.271
The modern Supreme Court has not followed this reading of Klein. As described above, the statute upheld in Bank Markazi explicitly applied to a pending case alone.272 Nevertheless, when the Supreme Court again addresses the
rule of decision principle, it should consider adopting an approach that distinguishes between statutes that reach pending cases alone and statutes that reach
both pending and future cases. Unlike the rule suggested by Thomas, this approach is easy for courts to administer in a principled way. This approach also
coheres with the constitutional value of legislative generality; but, unlike a rule
that places conclusive weight on the number of cases affected, it does so in a
way that better accounts for the value of legislative generality’s underlying
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Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235.
United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145 (1871).
269
Id. at 146.
270
United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 103, 109 (1801) (upholding statute
that changed the law in a case on appeal).
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Act of July 12, 1870, ch. 251, 16 Stat. 230, 235 (applying retrospectively to pardons already offered and accepted); see also Tyler, supra note 109 at 94–95 (noting that the congressional proponent of the proviso estimated the government’s liability to former rebels under the Abandoned and Captured Property Act at more than ten million dollars).
272
Bank Markazi v. Peterson, 136 S. Ct. 1310, 1318–19 (2016) (noting that statute at issue
applied to a single consolidated case).
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concerns. And, unlike a rule that turns on whether a single case or more than
one case is affected, this approach is consistent with Klein itself.273
First, a Klein rule that permits statutes to apply to pending cases so long as
it also applies to future, unknown cases is easy to administer. The statutory language itself will often determine conclusively whether a statute applies to pending cases only. In Bank Markazi, for example, the legislation deemed the assets
of Bank Markazi to be the assets of Iran, but only for ongoing litigation.274 In
that case it is easy to tell that the legislation applied to a pending case (or pending cases) and could not apply to future, unknown cases. Because this approach
does not turn on the precise number of pending cases, it also eliminates grey
areas created by an approach that focuses exclusively on the number of cases
affected.
Second, as noted above, a rule that turns on whether one case or more than
one case is affected aligns it with the value of legislative generality.275 However, for many of the reasons that legislation targeting a single individual has
been called unjust, legislation that targets a group of identifiable individuals also can be considered unjust. For example, because the legislature knows who
will benefit or suffer from the targeted legislation, legislation targeting both an
individual and a small group of known individuals can be prompted by corruption, animus, favoritism, or other illegitimate motives.276 As a result, a rule that
prevents the application of new law to a fixed universe of cases that are known
because they are already pending will be more closely aligned with a value of
legislative generality than a rule that is powerless when a statute targets two or
more pending cases.
An approach that turns on whether a change in law applies to pending cases only rather than on the absolute number of individuals targeted by the legislation also comports with the approach taken by state courts enforcing restrictions on targeted legislation under state constitutional law. When a statute
creates a closed class, one that cannot be augmented in the future, state courts
273

There are other plausible definitions of the term “class of cases.” One alternative is that
Klein used the term in the sense of “class legislation,” a constitutional doctrine important
until the early 20th century. Class legislation is “legislation that singles out a class for special
treatment without a concomitant public purpose.” Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component,
supra note 218, at 505. Impermissible class legislation is distinguished from permissible legislation that legislates for a natural or real class. People v. Canister, 110 P.3d 380, 383 (Colo.
2005). On this view, Klein may have held that the proviso was impermissible class legislation because it singled out a group of cases that was a subpart of a real or natural class. The
class legislation theory is no longer enforced as a stand-alone principle under the federal
Constitution. Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 218, at 524–25.
274
Bank Markazi, 136 S. Ct. at 1319.
275
See supra Section III.B.
276
Zoldan, The Equal Protection Component, supra note 218, at 496 (“After all, a statute
that singles out a small, determinable group raises many of the same concerns—like favoritism, animus, or encroachment on the judicial function—that attend individualized legislation.”).

21 NEV. L.J. 531

576

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:2

often invalidate the legislation as impermissibly special.277 When legislation
creates a class that includes known individuals, but which also could apply to
others in the future, courts tend to uphold it because it creates an open class.278
Legislation that affects pending cases maps on to this open-class / closed-class
dichotomy. When legislation affects pending cases alone, it creates a closed
class, whose members have been selected by the legislature for special treatment, perhaps with an impermissible motive. By contrast, when legislation applies to pending and future cases, the legislature acts, in part, from behind a
veil of ignorance, unaware of the full spectrum of cases that will be affected by
the change in law.279 The fact that the legislature cannot know everyone who
will be affected by a change makes it less likely that the legislature will use this
instrument to target known individuals because they cannot do so without risking unintended applications.
Third, unlike a rule that distinguishes between a single case and any number greater than one, an approach that distinguishes between pending cases only
and pending and future cases is consistent with Klein itself. As noted, the Klein
Court distinguished between “a particular class of cases,” over which Congress
has complete control, and a statute that unlawfully prescribes a rule of decision
to the courts “in cases pending before it.”280 This distinction demonstrates that
the Klein Court considered it possible that withdrawing jurisdiction may be unlawful even if more than one case is affected by the change in law.
Finally, this approach also makes sense of a somewhat cryptic passage in
Klein, in which the Court distinguished the appropriations proviso from the
statute it previously upheld in Wheeling Bridge.281 Wheeling Bridge arose from
the Court’s previous injunction against the operation of a bridge, which the
Court enjoined after finding that the bridge was a nuisance.282 After the operation of the bridge was enjoined, however, Congress enacted a statute that declared the bridge was not a nuisance.283 In Wheeling Bridge, the Court upheld
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Canister, 110 P.3d at 384 (“By contrast, a class that is drawn so that it will never have
any members other than those targeted by the legislation is illusory, and the legislation creating such a class is unconstitutional special legislation.”); Sierra Club v. Dep’t. of Transp.,
202 P.3d 1226, 1276 (Haw. 2009) (invalidating a statute as a special law when, although
framed as a general law, in reality applied only to a closed class of one).
278
MANDELKER ET AL., supra note 246, at 669–71 (discussing open class/closed class distinction).
279
Adrian Vermeule, Veil of Ignorance Rules in Constitutional Law, 111 YALE L.J. 399, 399
(2001) (arguing that the Constitution contains veil of ignorance rules that subject “decisionmakers to uncertainty about the distribution of benefits and burdens that will result from
a decision”).
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United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1871).
281
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 440 (1855).
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Id. at 447.
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Id. at 422.
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the application of the new law to the pending case, which resulted in the dissolution of the injunction.284
In Klein, the Court reaffirmed its previous holding in Wheeling Bridge; the
Court distinguished this previous case on the ground that, after the new law declared the bridge not to be a nuisance, the Court “was left to apply its ordinary
rules to the new circumstances created” by the change in law.285 As a result, no
“arbitrary rule of decision was prescribed in that case.”286 By contrast, the appropriations proviso was defective because it did not create new circumstances;
instead, it required the Court to apply the law to particular pending cases. In
making this distinction, Klein can be read to distinguish between a law that applies to pending cases alone and, on the other hand, a change in law that applies
to pending cases and future cases. On this reading, the Wheeling Bridge statute
was lawful because it declared that the bridge was not a nuisance—not only for
the injunction that was then in force—but also for any future lawsuits claiming
that the bridge was a nuisance. By contrast, the Wheeling Bridge statute would
have been defective had it declared the bridge lawful only for the purposes of
the injunction that was then in force.
In sum, when the Supreme Court again addresses the definition of “class of
cases” in the context of Klein, it should revive the distinction between statutes
that apply to pending cases only and, on the other hand, statutes that apply both
to pending and future cases. A definition that carries this distinction will be
easy for courts to administer because statutory language and legislative context
normally make clear whether a statute affects pending cases alone. This approach, moreover, is consistent with a value of legislative generality because it
is analogous to the open-class / closed-class distinction often used to define impermissible special legislation. And finally, this approach not only is consistent
with Klein, but it also makes sense of Klein’s puzzling passage distinguishing
Wheeling Bridge.
D. The Government’s Sovereign Immunity
In their concurrences, Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor took an approach
to Patchak that avoided all of the thorny issues discussed above. Instead, they
opined that the Gun Lake Act had the functional effect of asserting or restoring
the government’s sovereign immunity because it required the federal courts to
dismiss suits relating to the Bradley Property.287 Because some suits relating to
the Bradley Property would lie against the United States, and because the United States can always assert its immunity from suit, the Gun Lake Act was valid
284
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Klein, 80 U.S. at 146–47.
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Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 912–14 (2018) (Ginsburg, J., concurring & Sotomayor,
J., concurring).
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even though it directed a federal court to dismiss a particular, pending suit.288
The plurality did not address this argument; moreover, the Chief Justice failed
to counter the ultimate constitutional point asserted in these concurrences. Instead, he retreated to a statutory interpretation argument, opining that the Gun
Lake Act did not, in fact, assert the government’s sovereign immunity.289
1. The Limits of Sovereign Immunity
It is true that the Court has described Congress’s power to assert the government’s sovereign immunity in absolute terms. In a typical statement of this
principle, the Court has held that the United States subjects itself to suit only as
“an act of grace.”290 As a result, it may be inferred, Congress’s subsequent decision to withdraw jurisdiction from the federal courts over a suit against the
United States always will be honored by the courts.291
But, despite strong rhetorical statements about the government’s consent to
be sued, there is reason to doubt that the government’s sovereign immunity extends as far as Ginsburg and Sotomayor suggest. Most obviously, the scope of
immunity they describe is at odds with Klein itself. The statute invalidated in
Klein required federal courts to dismiss suits that only could be asserted against
the United States.292 Nevertheless, the Klein Court invalidated the proviso. If
Klein is good law, therefore, sovereign immunity, whatever its scope, does not
insulate a statute simply because it requires dismissal of suits against the United
States. The Klein Court made this point explicitly when it rejected the government’s argument that “the right to sue the government . . . is a matter of favor.”293 The Court emphasized, instead, that “it is as much the duty of the government as of individuals to fulfil its obligations.”294
Doctrine aside, Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s concurrences are still too broad:
it cannot be true that any statute terminating pending suits is saved from constitutional infirmity so long as it has the effect of dismissing claims against the
United States. Imagine a statute that requires the federal courts to dismiss all
claims asserted by a particular religious group against the United States. Be288

Id. at 912–913 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
Id. at 921–22 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
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District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62, 65 (1901).
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292
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cause this statute requires the dismissal of suits against the United States, it
would “restore[] the Federal Government’s sovereign immunity”295 as much as
did the Gun Lake Act. But, of course, this statute also would violate other constitutional provisions.296 As this example demonstrates, simply because a statute effectively asserts or “restores” the government’s sovereign immunity does
not determine whether it also generates other constitutional problems. As a result, the fact that the Gun Lake Act required the dismissal of suits against the
government does not determine whether it also violates the Constitution by directing a federal court to enter judgment in a pending case. If the Constitution
prohibits Congress from directing the result in a pending case, then a statute
that does so is not redeemed by the fact that it also terminates suits against the
government.297
2. A Principle Against Self-Dealing
The expansive vision of sovereign immunity proffered by Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor turns out to be implausibly broad. It is possible, however,
to imagine a more modest version of sovereign immunity. In a diverse set of
constitutional contexts,298 the Supreme Court has declined to uphold statutes
that reflect governmental self-dealing—that is—legislation that repudiates an
obligation of the government in a pending dispute.299 A principle that disfavors
legislative self-dealing is more modest than Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor’s
version of sovereign immunity because it protects the prerogatives of legislative power while also creating space for the independent operation of the feder295

Patchak, 138 S. Ct. at 912 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
This statute would likely violate the Constitution’s First Amendment, among other provisions. For an Article III example, consider the possibility of Congress creating a second Supreme Court authorized to hear appeals from judgments in which claims were asserted
against the United States, but which is required to dismiss all cases in which the United
States prevailed in the lower court. This provision would result in the dismissal of claims
against the United States, but it would also arguably violate Article III by creating a court of
last resort other than the “one Supreme Court” provided for in the Constitution. U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 1.
297
For a similar reason, Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion that Congress may always lawfully “confirm” administrative action that is itself constitutional is unpersuasive. For example, while an agency head may lawfully appoint inferior officers, it is unconstitutional for
Congress itself to appoint inferior officers. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. As a result, whether a
statute “confirms” administrative action does not determine whether it is otherwise unconstitutional.
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E.g., U.S. Tr. Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 1 (1977) (refusing to defer to states’ decision to breach bond obligations); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350 (1935) (holding
that the United States “is [not] free to ignore that pledge and alter the terms of its obligations
in case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient”); Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S.
513, 514 (2000) (retrospective rules that inure only to the benefit of the state implicate ex
post facto concerns).
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al courts. Examining some of the Court’s self-dealing cases suggests a principled way for courts to determine whether to uphold a statutory change in law
that has the effect of terminating suits against the United States.
In Winstar, the government was liable for breaching an agreement with
private parties because Congress’s repudiation of the government’s agreement
reflected self-dealing.300 The government was engaged in self-dealing because
the statute that repudiated its contract appeared to be an act of an interested party rather than the act of a regulating sovereign.301 The plurality suggested a sliding scale to determine whether the government may break its promise in the
course of regulating.302 A statute that impairs the government’s obligations, but
which does so only incidental to “the accomplishment of a broader governmental objective,” will be permitted as a disinterested, sovereign act.303 However,
the “greater the Government’s self-interest . . . the more suspect becomes the
claim that its private contracting partners ought to bear the financial burden.”304
And if “a substantial part of the impact of the Government’s action rendering
performance impossible falls on its own contractual obligations,” the government must honor its agreement.305
Similarly, in Perry v. United States,306 the Court rebuffed Congress’s attempt to claim immunity from suit for reneging on an obligation.307 The Court
held that the United States is not free to “alter the terms of its obligations in
case a later Congress finds their fulfillment inconvenient.”308 Indeed, while
Congress has a relatively free hand to regulate contractual obligations generally, this freedom does not extend to the government’s power “to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements.”309 The Court specifically rejected
the government’s argument that, as a sovereign, Congress could not be bound
to its contractual obligations.310 The power to enter into binding contracts is itself a sovereign power, the Court reasoned; therefore, disclaiming a previous
contractual obligation is as much a repudiation of sovereignty as abiding by
it.311
300

United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 896 (1996) (describing that statutes are
sometimes “tainted by a governmental object of self-relief”).
301
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In these cases, as well as in other contexts,312 the Court has refused to apply
a change in law that would have had the effect of benefitting the government in
pending cases when the new law reflected the government’s self-interest. In
these cases, the Court took pains to emphasize that it will respect, and defer to,
laws that apply even-handedly to the government and other parties. Whether a
statute reflects disinterested regulation rather than self-interest depends on the
extent to which the statute accomplishes some goal other than simply relieving
the government of an obligation.313
A principle against governmental self-dealing, as suggested by Winstar,
Perry, and similar cases, can guide courts considering whether to apply a new
law purporting to terminate, because of the government’s sovereign immunity,
a suit pending against the United States. Consider how a principle against selfdealing could be used to evaluate Patchak. The surest effect of the Gun Lake
Act was to save the government from the burden of defending itself in the
pending suit brought by Patchak.314 Like the statutes invalidated in Winstar and
Perry, therefore, the Gun Lake Act repudiated the government’s obligation under existing law. On the other hand, Interior’s decision to take the Bradley
Property into trust did more than alter the government’s obligation; because it
arguably reached all suits relating to the Bradley Property, the burden of the
Gun Lake Act did not fall exclusively on Patchak.315 Moreover, even if, as a
practical matter, the statute affected Patchak’s lawsuit alone, unlike the Winstar
and Perry statutes, the Gun Lake Act created only a modest benefit for the
United States. Other than the cost of defending against Patchak’s suit, it did not
benefit the government financially. Instead, the stated and likely reason for the
government’s action was to benefit the Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish.316 On this
view of the government’s action, the Gun Lake Act can be seen as part of the
government’s effort to assist the tribe rather than to self-deal.
The Winstar-Perry analysis will not always provide an easy answer to difficult questions about the purposes and effects of the government’s actions.
Nevertheless, evaluating a claim of sovereign immunity in light of a principle
against self-dealing should be attractive to courts resolving similar future cases.
An approach based on a principle against governmental self-dealing resonates
312
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Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 909–10 (2018) (describing the effect of the Gun Lake
Act).
315
Id. (describing the possible broader reach of the Gun Lake Act).
316
Id. (describing the purpose of Interior’s decision to take the property into trust).

21 NEV. L.J. 531

582

NEVADA LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 21:2

with other areas of constitutional law. It preserves both the prerogative of Congress to determine its exposure to liability and the power of courts to decide
pending cases. And perhaps most importantly, this approach rejects an implausibly broad vision of sovereign immunity while still allowing the government
to assert immunity when it regulates disinterestedly.
CONCLUSION
The core of judicial independence is the power of the courts to resolve cases pending before them without legislative interference. But, when Congress
directs the courts to reach particular results in pending cases, it blurs the line
between the judicial and legislative powers. The Supreme Court has not defended the core of judicial independence, instead upholding increasingly intrusive statutes that direct the courts to enter judgment for particular parties. Although the line between the judicial power and legislative power is surely fuzzy,
the Court can, and should, refine its approach to ensure that the core of judicial
independence is not lost altogether. The Court should not apply a change in law
to pending cases when the law fails to set policy, when it singles out an individual for special treatment, when it withdraws jurisdiction solely for the purpose of terminating pending cases, or when it reflects governmental selfdealing. Observing these limitations on Congress’s power to direct the result in
pending cases allows Congress ample room to fulfill its lawmaking function.
But, unlike the Court’s current approach, it also preserves the courts’ role to
actually decide cases rather than just enter judgment at the direction of Congress.

